Tuesday, August 20, 2019

Wages and the Business Cycle 3


It’s curious how little guidance our standard models give us about what should happen in labour markets as we come out of a recession.  Employment will increase, of course, but what should happen to the nominal wage?  It’s a bit unfair to be criticizing newspapers for relying on gut feelings, if economic models aren’t giving clear testable hypotheses, at the very least.

Consider the sticky-nominal-wage models.  In those models, nominal wages are sticky downwards, not upwards.  It’s unlikely that nominal wages will fall in a recovery, and there’s a reasonable chance they’ll remain unchanged, if only because there’s still an excess supply of labour so firms don’t have to raise wages to attract labour yet, but as to whether they’ll rise, all we can really say is that if they do, they can’t rise any faster than the price level does, since in the s-n-w models the real wage should be falling , at least through the early stage of the recovery. 

Wages and the Business Cycle 2


The issue of how real and nominal wages should behave over the business cycle at one point prompted a boom in business cycle models.  You have the gut feeling that real wages should be rising in an upswing and falling in a downswing, and there’s a bunch of literature – perhaps the preponderance – which at best doesn’t support the prediction of the sticky-nominal-wage models that real wages should be counter- cyclical: that they should rise in a downturn and fall in a recovery.  The question then was how to build a testable model which might be able to accommodate that view of the world.  One answer seemed to be real business cycle models.

Wages and the Business Cycle 1


One of the trickiest things for newspaper economics journalists, it seems, is to try and sort out what should happen to wages during business cycle ups and downs.  Certainly, a lot of the American press at the moment seem to think that there’s something wrong with the present recovery because wages aren’t rising, or not rising as rapidly as the press had expected.  You do get recognition that wages are rising in certain sectors of the US economy, typically sectors like housing construction where the markets are local and fall into the category that Stock and Watson recently identified as cyclically sensitive (meaning, in essence, producing non-tradeables) but there seems to be a broad feeling in the US press (and to a degree the Canadian, although there seems to be growing awareness that what happens in the US isn’t automatically mirrored in Canada) that for a recovery as long as the present one (albeit a slow recovery), wages should have risen broadly.

Wednesday, August 7, 2019

Currency Matters


The US/China trade and possibly currency wars are rolling along in what seems to be a random walk with upward drift.  Pretty much the only thing you can say about them is that they’re a source of significant uncertainty.  It’s hard to say how far the two sides are prepared to push the matter in practical terms.

The latest move from the Trump administration has been to label China a currency manipulator, meaning that China has broken international rules about using the value of their currency as an instrument for stimulating exports.  This is not an easy claim to evaluate – a while back Donald Trump  was also claiming that the European Central Bank was a currency manipulator.  In some senses it’s a charge which could be levied against pretty much every country, since most places give the impression that they believe that their best hope for stimulating their economies is for someone else to pull them out of recession buy buying more of that the first country wants to export.  And it’s pretty hard to distinguish between policies aimed at currency depreciation and easy money policies aimed at domestic stimulus.

Tuesday, August 6, 2019

Heretics Versus Jerome Powell


Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s attempts to justify the decision to cut the US policy rate do not seem to be garnering rave reviews.  Most of the criticisms in the press seem to come down to the idea that the Fed should have cut rates more if it really wanted to stimulate the economy.  The press seems to have developed a pretty firm faith in the power of monetary policy to drive the economy.

They might have developed that view as a result of hearing economists talk about policy options over the past many years.  Monetary policy has been the focus of the bulk of theoretical writings for quite some time now.  That probably comes out of two observations.

More on the Gold Standard


Ardent supporters of a return to gold are prone to arguing that committing to holding the value of gold in terms of dollars (and therefore the value of the dollar in terms of gold) constant would stabilize the prices of commodities generally or, another way of saying the same thing, hold the real purchasing power of the dollar constant over time.  They’re prone to pointing to the pre-first World War Gold Standard period as evidence that economic stability goes along with backing the currency with gold, and arguing that persistent inflation only became the norm when countries no longer made holding the value of their currencies constant in terms of gold their primary economic objective.
In assessing their claims, it’s worth taking a few minutes to consider how the Gold Standard (which in the pure form which the gold bugs cite only existed for about 50 years) came into being.

Monday, August 5, 2019

Should the Fed say anything at all?


The Wall Street Journal told us recently  that “Jerome Powell’s Off-the-Cuff Approach Leaves Investors on Edge”.

Seems Fed-watchers in the markets can’t figure out what to make of Chairman Jerome Powell’s “effort to bring a more plain-spoken approach to communicating with the public.”.  They were confused by his comments prior to the most recent policy rate decision.  Was he saying that there definitely would be more rate cuts in the future, and then, when he made the July announcement, was he saying after all that there wouldn’t be?

Thursday, August 1, 2019

The Fed’s July 31 Interest Rate Cut


The Fed cut its policy rate on July 31, as most commentators had expected it would do.  The stock markets initially dropped, since the rate cut was smaller than traders had hoped for and because Chairman Powell’s comments didn’t seem to commit the Fed to further cuts.  By August 1 U.S. stocks were up again; according to the Wall Street Journal because traders expect that the Fed will again cut rates again later in the year.  The key question here, of course, is whether the cut will actually do anything to stimulate the economy.  There are pretty good grounds for thinking that the stock market’s response simply reflects the probability of making profit from adjusting portfolio composition rather than from a growing economy.

Monday, July 29, 2019

The changing nature of CPI inflation


The Wall Street Journal ran a piece by Paul Kiernan recently ( here but gated ), which starts by saying that one reason that the Fed is expected to cut interest rates at its next fixing is because inflation is running persistently below the 2% target.  (It’s worth keeping in mind that at the time 2% was picked as the target rate of inflation for many central banks, it wasn’t because there was careful research saying that 2% was somehow the optimal rate, it was because the figured that bringing inflation down to around 2% would be a pretty great achievement.) Setting aside, for the moment, the question of whether central banks should be trying to get up to 2%, Kiernan raises an interesting piece of evidence as to why CPI inflation is persistently below 2%.

Friday, July 26, 2019

The State of Macroeconomics


Judy Shelton, one of the names Donald Trump has said he’s going to put forward for nomination to the Board of Governors of the federal reserve, is probably the best known of the current crop of gold bugs, but she’s by no means the only one.  For example, SteveForbes of Forbes magazine, who’s run for president a couple of times, recently wrote a column in which he called on Mark Zuckerberg to back Facebook’s Libra cryptocurrency with gold rather than with the portfolio of safe assets in a range of currencies which Facebook has been proposing. (He also urged Zuckerberg to change the name of the cryptocurrency from the Libra to the Mark.  Presumably somebody at Facebook nixed calling it the Zuck.) 

Tuesday, July 23, 2019

Dr. Judy Shelton for the Fed


Donald Trump has taken some flack (there’s a certain redundancy there, isn’t there) for his decision to nominate Judy Shelton to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.  At the same time he nominated Christopher Waller, but since Waller is the director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, his nomination is taken as reassuringly orthodox.

Dr. Shelton, on the other hand, has faced severe criticism on a number of fronts: her Ph.D. is in Business Administration, not Economics; she’s shifted from being a critic of the Fed’s low interest rate policy before Donald Trump was elected to calling on the fed to cut rates today, the presumption being that she was angling for a job with the Trump Administration; and, most notably, she’s called for a return to the Gold Standard.

Sunday, July 14, 2019

The July 2019 Monetary Policy Report 2: Risks to the Bank of Canada’s Inflation Outlook


As part of the Monetary Policy Report ( pdf here), the Bank of Canada includes a section on risks, in which it includes both up-side and down-side risks.  Up-side risks are factors which could push the AD curve further to the right than the Bank had anticipated, and they’re really only risks if Canada is pretty close to potential output, in which case the output gap could close unexpectedly and inflation build up faster than the Bank anticipated.  So having a good handle on where GDP is relative to potential, by which, if we’re working with a very Keynesian AS curve, we mean how close we are to the region of GDP in which the AS curve goes from being flat to being positively sloped, and equally importantly, how quickly that positively sloped region steepens into the vertical region of the AS curve, is extremely important in judging what the Bank should be doing with interest rates.

Broadly speaking, we can categorize risks under a couple of headings.  There are external risks, which we can only assess and try to respond to, and there are policy response risks which relate to how the Canadian economy reacts to the Bank’s policy actions.

What do we mean by well-anchored inflation expectations?


The recent Globe and Mail commentary  by Bill Robson and Jeremy Kronick of the C.D, Howe Institute was in response to remarks made in the Canadian Senate by Sen Diane Bellemare in which she recommended that full employment be added to the Bank of Canada’s policy targets.  Sen. Bellemare recentlyresponded in the Globe to Robson and Kronick’s argument.  Much of her Globe piece consists of things like observations that other countries central banks have dual mandates, but as part of her argument,  Sen. Bellemere refers to:

 “………the view expressed on Jan. 4 at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, by two former chairs of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke, and by the current chair, Jerome Powell. They said that the trade-off between inflation and employment is no longer seen as a problem. Therefore, there is no need to achieve price stability at the expense of employment.”
The idea that the inflation/unemployment trade-off is not a problem comes out of the fact that unemployment, in both Canada and the US, has been falling to long term lows without inflation being pushed up above the central bank targets of 2%.   Actually, the business about the trade-off between inflation and employment longer being seen as a problem is not quite what was said (you can watch the AEA session here.)  What Janet Yellen actually said was that the Phillips Curve was currently very flat, and Ben Bernanke emphasized that inflation expectations are currently well anchored. 

Thursday, July 11, 2019

The July 2019 Monetary Policy Report 1


The Bank of Canada brought out its July 2019 Monetary Policy Report recently ( pdf here).  The MPR is written for the press and the general public, so it’s short on technical modelling detail.  That’s why we have to dig into it a bit to get a sense of what lies beneath the Bank’s decision to hold the policy rate unchanged.

There are a number of interesting points, one of which is the fact that interest rates really don’t get discussed all that much in the report – at least, not in the sense of a discussion of the magnitudes of the effects of changing interest rates.  But that’s something  we’ll look at in another post.

What I want to look at in this post is the way the Bank is thinking about the effects of a possible escalation of the U.S./China trade war, how that feeds into its policy decisions, and how the Bank’s thinking seems to differ from the Fed’s.

Wednesday, July 10, 2019

More fun With the CPI


There are interesting things hidden in the depths of the monthly CPI report.  Remember that the CPI-Total inflation rate is calculated as a weighted average of the rates of inflation of individual commodities and that any time you’re working with a weighted average, the overall average will change if the distribution of weights across items changes, even if the values of the items being averaged don’t change.  In the case of the overall (CPI-Total) inflation rate, the weights are the shares of total consumer expenditure devoted to each commodity, as found in Statistics Canada’s household expenditure surveys, so rates of inflation for commodities which take up a larger percentage of the consumer’s expenditure get greater weight in calculating the CPI-Total inflation rate. 

Sunday, July 7, 2019

Thinking about the CPI 1


Statistics Canada recently released  the May 2019 figures for the Consumer Price Index.  The 12 month inflation rate (meaning the percentage increase in the CPI from May 2018 to May 2019) was 2.4%, up from 2% in April 2019 (i.e. the increase in April 2019 relative to April 2018).  Putting it that way makes it sound as if all prices rose at the same general rate.  In fact there was considerable variation among commodities.

For example, fresh vegetables rose 16.7% over the year, contributing to a rise in food prices overall of 3.4% while gasoline fell 3.7%.  The StatCan report gives a list of the main upward and downward contributors to the 12 month increase. 

Friday, June 28, 2019

Modelling International Financial Flow Effects


A number of papers are running stories like this one by Victor Ferreira from the Financial Post, the gist of which is that if the Fed cuts its policy interest rate while the Bank of Canada leaves its unchanged, the Canadian dollar will rise from around 76¢ US, perhaps to 80¢, at which point, the story goes, damage to Canadian exports will force the Bank to cut Canadian interest rates.

It’s by no means an implausible story, but it’s interesting to think about the formal modelling process the Bank would be looking at in deciding what to do.

Wednesday, June 26, 2019

Thinking About Policy Making


Larry Schembri’s discussion  of Canada’s experience with flexible exchange rates in the 1950s includes references to a couple of papers from the 1960s.  One is Robert Mundell’s (1963) Canadian Journal of Economics paper on the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates.  Mundell’s paper is a classic in the literature (which means it’s cited by more people than have actually read it).  Another paper which Schembri cites is a 1964 Journal of Political Economy paper by Rudolf Rhomberg, “A Model of the Canadian Economy Under Fixed and Fluctuating Exchange Rates”
  
The Rhomberg paper was one which I hadn’t run into before, but it presents a nice counterpart to Mundell’s paper.

Tuesday, June 25, 2019

Another Canadian First


As we watch the ongoing sparring between the Trump White House and the Federal Reserve, with the question of whether the President can fire the Chair of the Fed always looming in the background, it’s worth keeping in mind that we (Canada) went through this once ourselves. 

And by This, I mean the whole thing – populist head of government, who was convinced that the head of the central bank was running a tight money policy with the deliberate aim of sabotaging the government’s expansionary economic policy, central bank head sticking to his guns, head of government threatening to fire him, despite its not being clear whether a policy disagreement constituted grounds for dismissal, the whole works.  In our case, it ended with the head of the central bank effectively being fired.

It happened in 1961, and it’s known in Canadian economic history as the Coyne Affair.

Sunday, June 23, 2019

MMT, Functional Finance and the Government Budget Constraint, an overview


When you set aside some of the odder rhetoric, a lot of what some proponents of MMT seem to argue (notice the number of qualifiers there) fits into an older, but still mainstream, Keynesian tradition.  Many analysis regard that model as having failed in the 1970s episode of the Great Inflation, but it’s important to remember that much of the policy analysis being undertaken in that period didn’t include an Aggregate Supply curve in its formal structure.  Early in the General Theory, Keynes identified the notion of the Aggregate Supply curve as a key element of his model, but it had pretty much disappeared from the version which, in the 1960s, became mainstream Keynesianism and was replaced by an exclusive focus on Aggregate Demand.  At least some MMTers seem to have in mind a model with a downward sloping AD curve (probably pretty steep, meaning that AD is not very price elastic) and a Keynesian AS curve consisting of a horizontal segment,  followed, as aggregate income increases along the horizontal axis of the graph, by a positively sloped region which in turn is followed by a vertical region.  At the very least, using that framework, whether or not it’s what the MMTers have in mind, lets us consider the extent to which MMT results can be found in a more mainstream framework.

Saturday, June 22, 2019

MMT and the Theory of the Government Budget Constraint 2


In an earlier post we sketched out a 1970s literature which we argued has a lot in common with Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).  We considered the case where we start at AD/AS equilibrium at an equilibrium level of income where the government’s budget is in balance but where the economy is operating below full employment.   We considered the case where an increase in government spending is used to shift the AD curve to the right, and the resulting deficit is financed by printing money.  In accord with much of the 1970’s literature we assume that the aggregate price level is constant through all of this – that we’re operating on the horizontal segment of the Keynesian AS curve.  They key theoretical point is that the deficit which arises as a result of the fiscal expansion will persist as long as we hold G at the full employment level, and that deficit will have to be financed every period (which really means that G will have to be paid for anew each period) so the money supply will grow continuously even if Y doesn’t change.

Saturday, June 15, 2019

MMT and Inflation


One of the key elements of the MMT argument is the claim that their money finance proposal is not inherently inflationary.  They put this forward in contradiction of the monetarist argument that inflation is a result of increasing the money supply faster than the rate at which GDP is increasing.  (Interestingly, David Andolfatto seems to classify MMT as a version of monetarism.)   As in so many instances, what you take as MMT theory depends on which MMT theorist you’re reading – some seem more open than others to the idea that money-financed spending, shifting the AD curve to the right, might at  some point (i.e. when the AD curve reaches the steeply positively sloped segment of the AS curve) create an inflationary process which would have to be countered by using taxes to pull money out of the economy. 

Thursday, June 13, 2019

MMT and the Theory of the Government Budget Constraint 1


One of the key arguments which MMTers all seem to share is the view that there is no such thing as a government budget constraint, at least, not for a government which can print its own money.  There’s a certain irony to this, since the bit of traditional theory with which MMT seems to have the most in common is the Government Budget Constraint literature of the 1970s, as represented by Blinder and Solow (1973), and extended by Takayama (1980).

The Great Inflation and the End of Bretton Woods


The VoxEU Policy Portal is a site at which a wide range of economists post one- page summaries of their recent research.  The wide range of material which gets posted there, on a wide range of topics, makes it a blog worth keeping an eye on.  Economic historian Michael Bordo recently put up a piece entitled “The imbalances of the Bretton Woods System between 1965 and 1973: US inflation, the elephant in the room” dealing with the factors which led to the end of the Bretton Woods system.

The Bretton Woods system was an agreement negotiated in the late stages of the Second World War to try and set the rules for the post-war international monetary system.  The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund emerged from Bretton Woods.

Wednesday, June 12, 2019

Modern Monetary Theory 4


The basic MMT policy argument seems to start from the assumption that the economy is at AD/AS equilibrium with equilibrium income below the full employment level.  Assume also that, at that equilibrium, the government’s budget is in balance, so the tax revenue, T, generated at that level of aggregate income, is just equal to whatever level of government spending, G, which is being done.  The AD curve can be shifted to the right by increased G, but to hold equilibrium income at the full employment level will require additional G in excess of the additional T that will be generated by the higher aggregate income, so holding equilibrium income at the full employment level will require the government to run a deficit.

Tuesday, June 11, 2019

So What's Out There In The Way of Economics Blogs?


Economics blogging is not what it once was nor, if one is being honest, was it ever what people hoped it would be.  Still, there are a number of blogs it’s worth being aware of.

The best known econ blog is probably Marginal Revolution, run by Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University.  Tyler posts several times daily on anything that interests him, and he has a wide range of interests.  Alex posts less frequently and on a tighter range of topics – intellectual property is one of his particular interests, but recently he’s been posting on a monograph he co-authored that analyzed the time path of a range of prices in the US.  One of MR’s strengths is the links Tyler posts to other sites and news pieces.  He also posts excerpts from, and links to, his regular columns for Bloomberg.  One interesting thing about econblogging is the number of econbloggers who moved to posting on more widely read sites.  Other publishers seem to keep an eye out for people who can write well on economics issues.

Sunday, June 9, 2019

Modern Monetary Theory 3


There’s a lot in at least some versions of MMT which overlaps with old Keynesian theory (and some, but rather less, which overlaps with new Keynesianism).  Let’s see what that overlap is (with the caveat that this is my interpretation of some MMT writings and that there are undoubtedly MMT theorists who would reject it, not to mention those MMT theorists who don’t believe in the validity of formal modelling at all).  I’ll stick key qualifiers in, but keep in mind that this is an outsider’s interpretation.  For links to various MMTers statements of their understanding of the theory, see here.

Thursday, June 6, 2019

MMT, With Japan in the Middle


In the squabbling on the internet over Modern Monetary theory, Japan has emerged, at least in some people’s minds, as the prime test case.  Considering the Japanese economic experience through the 80s into the lost decade of the 90’s, and on into its own version of Quantitative Easing, and its inability to stimulate much in the way of increased output or much in the way of inflation, it’s a country which seems well suited to providing data for testing conventional monetarism, MMT, and probably also the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level.  That would, of course, be a lot easier if there were a well defined body of MMT theory which could be used to develop formal statistical tests.

As it is, we’re forced to rely on websites and newspaper reports: see here, as well as here and here for example.  The New York Times has a longish piece on the Japan question here which we’ll deal with in a later post – I still have some posts on MMT itself to go up.  Be warned that the NYT piece is really just a list of who says Japan is following MMT and who says it isn’t – the most interesting thing in many of the pieces I’ve linked to is when MMTers are cited as saying that no, Japan isn’t implementing MMT.

So Who Should Be Running The Central Bank?


As Stephen Poloz’s term as Governor of the Bank of Canada nears its presumed end, articles have started to appear dealing with the question of who his successor should be.  The betting seems to favour senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins (and has done for a while) although a  number of other names are also mentioned. 

One issue which comes up occasionally is the background required of the Governor.  Before he went to the the Fed, Ben Bernanke had had a distinguished academic career, and while Janet Yellen was probably best known from the San Francisco Fed, she also had an academic background.  Jerome Powell, on the other hand, spent much of his career in financial markets.  Peter Diamond  was at one point a nominee for a position on the Fed’s board of governors but was opposed (in a decision most economists found hard to believe) on the grounds that his work wasn’t sufficiently money-macro.  Wilkins has a BA from Laurier and a Masters from Western, and has been a career civil servant.

Clearly the Governor of the Bank needs a very specific skill set.  They don’t necessarily have to be a top-level academic researcher, but they do need to be able to consider the recommendations made by the bank’s research staff and to explain decisions made on the basis of that research to politicians and, increasingly these days, to the press and public.  But there’s still a question of the type of analytic skills the governor should have.

Wednesday, June 5, 2019

The Greenspan Put Lives


A Put is a contract which guarantees you the right to sell a particular financial instrument at a set price, within some set time period.  If the market price of the instrument in question stays high, you don’t make use of the put, but if the price of that instrument falls below the pre-set price, you have the option of exercising the put and selling at the set price, which is presumably above the current price and higher than you expect the price to be in the relevant future.

Obviously there has to be someone on the other side of the deal – someone who has guaranteed that they will buy the instrument at the set price if you decide to exercise the put and sell the instrument.  In the standard case, they’re not doing this out of the goodness of their heart: you pay them a fee for the put, so they’re betting that the instrument’s price will stay above the level specified in the put, meaning that they won’t have to buy the instrument from you, so they’ll profit by the amount of the fee you're paying them.

The Greenspan Put is the term used to refer to former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan’s  perceived over-sensitivity to the stock market.  It referred to the perception that the Fed under Greenspan could be counted on to respond to a drop in stock prices by easing monetary policy – basically, Greenspan’s critics argued – that the Fed would print money to prop up the market.

Saturday, June 1, 2019

Interpreting GDP


Japanese GDP grew at an annualized rate of 2.1% in the first quarter of this year, according to the latest estimates, which was much faster than had been expected.  This has not, however, been greeted as a good sign.   As Tim Worstall notes here, the chief reason for the increase in GDP was the fact the fall in imports (M) outweighed that in exports (X), which produced an increase in net exports (X-M) which was large enough to more than cancel out the weak performance of C+I+G. 

This is a result which is almost Trumpian in nature: cut imports and GDP rises.  (Pierre Lemieux has a critical comment on this kind of interpretation here   and Alex Tabarrok has one here.)    If nothing else, it’s a reminder that it’s important to think about what an economic statistic was designed for.  Every introductory macroeconomics textbook makes the point that GDP is not a measure of welfare, however that term might be defined (although very few newsreaders seem to have grasped that point).  That’s also why most proposals for Green GDP measures make no sense – they’re trying to come up with a single sufficient statistic for well-being: one number which we can look at and instantly see whether we, as a society, are better or worse off in some broad sense.  

Wednesday, May 29, 2019

Modern Monetary Theory 2


One of the key assumptions of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) has been referred to (by critics of MMT) as a notional merging of the monetary and fiscal authorities – the central bank, the department of finance and the spending departments – under a single heading: Government.  This leads to an odd characterization of the effects of government spending on the money supply.

Friday, May 24, 2019

Reconsidering Okun's Law

A recent paper by Lim, Dixon and van Ours (2018) (note - the link is to a pdf of their working paper) has an interesting discussion of issues pertaining to estimating Okun’s Law relationships.  There are a couple of versions of Okun’s Law:  broadly it deals with the relation between aggregate output and the unemployment rate but it is sometimes written as a relation between changes in output and changes in the unemployment rate and other times as a relation between two gaps – the gap between actual unemployment and the natural rate, as a function of the gap between actual and potential output.  Lim et al. (2018) deal with the changes version – what must the rate of growth of real output be if unemployment is to be held constant, or to fall.

Okun’s Law dates from the 1960s, and fell into abeyance for quite a while, but there’s been something of a revival in interest in it in recent years, connected with the revival in interest in the concept of the output gap.  The gaps version is a more natural fit for that literature, but implementing it requires that we be able to estimate both the potential level of output and the natural rate of unemployment.  For practical purposes the changes version is easier to implement, but runs into the problem that the estimated relation, as judged by the coefficient on the rate of growth in real output in the unemployment equation, seems to change over time.    One objective of Lim et al. (2018) is to investigate why that might be the case.

Thursday, May 23, 2019

Modern Monetary Theory 1

Returning, for a bit, to Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), its current popularity in certain sections does inspire a certain interest in trying to sort out what it’s all about.  Most critical comment on it has focused on the interpretation that MMT theorists hold that governments can run money-financed deficits to whatever degree they choose and for as long as they choose without generating inflation.  This seems to me to be more the politicians’ take on MMT than the theorists’, but the fact that MMT theorists reject the notion of formal mathematical modelling makes it hard to sort out which among them is thinking in terms of what model.

Wednesday, May 22, 2019

The New York Times on the Fed’s Puzzle


The New York Times ran a piece on May 21 dealing, ultimately, with the Fed’s problem figuring out where the neutral rate of interest is these days, although that term isn’t used in the article itself.  The primary focus of the article is on the ongoing puzzle of the relation between inflation and indicators of labour market tightness.  The framing device is the story of a restaurateur in North Carolina whose business is booming and who is hiring but who doesn’t want to risk passing higher wage rates on her customers in the form of higher prices, because no-one else in the industry is raising their prices.  

Monday, May 20, 2019

Quantitative Easing and the Yield Curve

We tend to think of Quantitative Easing in terms of the massive increase in the US monetary base which it produced.  As a number of commentators have observed, in one sense this easing wasn’t unconventional monetary policy, it was conventional open market operations on a massive scale.  One part of Fed policy since 2008 which can legitimately be termed unconventional relates to the nature of the debt the Fed was buying.  Traditionally, central banks have restricted themselves to dealing in very short term government bonds and re-discounting short term bills of exchange.  One argument for this focus has been that central bank trading in short maturity debt would affect short term interest rates, and that arbitrage by financial investors as they adjusted their portfolios to the changed relative pattern of interest rates would cause rates on instruments of longer maturities to move in the same direction as short term rates were moving.

John Cochrane on Modern Monetary Theory


John Cochrane, formerly of the University of Chicago and now of the Hoover Institution, wrote a blog post, a little while ago, giving his take on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).  It had the potential to be very interesting, considering that MMT and Cochrane’s own Fiscal Theory of thePrice Level (FTPL) start from the proposition that state-issued money has value only because the state will accept it in payment of taxes.

Wednesday, May 15, 2019

The Stock Market and the Economy

The main thrust of the May 7 FP piece by David Rosenberg which was referred to in a previous post was that “..... the stock market has no statistically significant relationship with the underlying economy…….”.  It’s an argument which has been made many times over many years, but it carries particular freight in the era of Quantitative Easing by the Fed.  One of the channels through which QE was supposed to have an effect is referred to as the Portfolio Balance Channel – while Rosenberg takes a slightly different tack than I’m going to here, his article reminds us that we need to think of a portfolio as containing stocks, bonds and cash, and raises the question of the extent to which central bankers’ policy decisions should incorporate responses to stock market behaviour.

This isn’t a new question.  In the run-up to the 1929 crash the (still relatively new) Fed board debated whether monetary policy should respond to the on-going run-up in the market, and more recently the Fed is said to have responded to the stock market 1987 crash by running monetary policy which effectively set the stage for later bubbles.  Austrian School economists (see the Coordination Problem blog, for example) argue that badly designed monetary policy lies behind most financial bubbles – the central bank runs too easy a monetary regimen for too long then, when it realizes its mistake, tightens up too sharply, causing the bubble to burst and triggering a recession.  In the case of post-2008 Fed policy, QE, which resulted in a significant increase in the size of the monetary base, involved the fed making very large scale purchases of US government debt on the open market (the Fed has historically been banned from buying government bonds directly from the Treasury, so it has to conduct open market operations through the auction market).  This was something it was quite capable of doing because it could basically bid up the price of the debt it was buying to whatever level was necessary to persuade its holders to sell.  The result was that groups which had been holding the debt were now holding more cash than they had planned, and started looking for income-generating assets to put it in.  With interest rates at historically low levels, they put a higher proportion than would otherwise have been the case in the stock market, which tended to drive stock prices up.

Tuesday, May 14, 2019

Measuring Labour Market Tightness

Apropos of the release of the April Canadian Labour Force Survey, there was an interesting piece in the New York Times  a little while ago on the question of why wages have been so sluggish in their response to falling unemployment.  One argument that’s made in the piece is that the unemployment rate is the wrong indicator of labour market tightness – that we should be looking at the non-employment rate among prime age individuals.  Non-employment includes both the registered unemployed and those people who have dropped out of the labour force – discouraged workers who would be willing to work but have stopped looking for work, in the sense required to have them counted as being in the labour force.  In terms of the official measures, they show up in the form of a decline in the labour force participation rate.  The argument’s been made that the reason wage growth has been sluggish is that improved employment opportunities have drawn discouraged workers back into the labour force, shifting the labour supply curve to the right and restraining the wage growth that might otherwise accompany an outward shift of the labour demand curve.

Sunday, May 12, 2019

A Note On The April 2019 Labour Force Survey

The April 2019 Labour Force Survey results made a lot of headlines because of the size of the increase in employment, but for purposes of judging where we are relative to potential output, and therefore what the Bank of Canada is likely to be doing, the details are what matter .

QE and Investment

There's an interesting piece by David Rosenberg in the May 7 Financial Post.  His focus is on whether we should be taking the behavior of the stock market (specifically the US market) as an indicator of the health of the broader economy in the era of Quantitative Easing (in the US – it’s important to remember that the Bank of Canada didn’t engage in the same kind of QE), but in the process he also touches on the effect of QE on the real economy.  His argument is that the rise in the broader stock market indices doesn’t actually reflect fundamentals, as we usually think of them, in the real economy.  As he puts it: “……….today’s stock market has no statistically significant relationship with the underlying economy as it has in the past, nor is it a leading indicator by any stretch of the imagination.”

Let’s look at one of the points Rosenberg’ makes about investment.