One of the key elements of the MMT argument is the claim
that their money finance proposal is not inherently inflationary. They put this forward in contradiction of the
monetarist argument that inflation is a result of increasing the money supply
faster than the rate at which GDP is increasing. (Interestingly, David Andolfatto seems to
classify MMT as a version of monetarism.) As in so many instances, what you
take as MMT theory depends on which MMT theorist you’re reading – some seem
more open than others to the idea that money-financed spending, shifting the AD
curve to the right, might at some point
(i.e. when the AD curve reaches the steeply positively sloped segment of the AS
curve) create an inflationary process which would have to be countered by using
taxes to pull money out of the economy.
The pure monetarist inflationary position holds when the AD
curve cuts the vertical segment of the AS curve. In that case, a rightward shift of the AD
curve with no shift of the AS curve will definitely be inflationary. To the extent that the AS curve is shifting
to the right, because of an exogenous growth process (driven, perhaps, by past
investment spending), part of the tendency for the price level to rise will be
countered. If the AS curve is shifting
to the right at the same rate as the AD curve, where the shift of the AD curve
is assumed to be driven by an expansion of the money supply, there will be no
tendency for the general price level to rise.
The fundamental point of weakness in the conventional
argument, which the MMT argument draws on, is how is it that exogenous
expansions of the money supply are converted into inflationary pressure. They make the argument that the massive
increase in the US Monetary Base associated with Quantitative Easing did not,
contrary to the expectation of many mainstream economists, create an inflation,
and that the Japanese government has not succeeded in creating inflation with
its own monetary expansion. Yet standard
theory holds that expanding the money supply faster than real output is
expanding must cause inflation.
The key to understanding how the QE episode differs from the
standard inflation examples lies in something that Richard Cantillon pointed
out back in about 1730. To understand
the effects of an increase in the money supply on the real economy, you have to
pay attention to the way the money enters the economy. The Cantillon effect is invoked most often to
explain how it is that expansions of the money supply could have an effect on
real output in the short run even if its only effect in the long run is on the
price level (meaning that any short run effect on real output must at some
point be undone).
In the argument which we are considering, the key issue is
whether the money enters the economy by being given to someone who intends to
spend it on goods and services.
Consider the classic examples of monetarist inflations
through history: inflation in China in the days of Marco Polo, the episode of
the playing card money in New France, the Weimar hyperinflation of the 1920s
and the Great Inflation of the 1970s. In
each case the reason for the printing of large quantities of new money was to
allow someone to do spending which would otherwise not be possible. In most cases this was the government
directly. Printing money allowed the
government to spend, and hence take ownership of gods and services, without previously having used its power of
direct taxation to reduce the spending power of the private sector. The government takes the newly printed money
and buys goods with it, leaving less for the private sector to buy, even though
the private sector’s holdings of the transactions medium (money) have not ben
reduced. The purpose of the printing of
the new money is basically to let the government get in first and buy goods.
Whether this will cause an inflation, of course, depends on
where the AD curve cuts the AS curve. If
the intersection is in the horizontal segment of a Keynesian AS curve, the
economy can respond to the increase in government demand for goods by producing
more goods, and real output will expand at the same rate as demand shifted to
the right with no significant increase in prices. If the economy is operating at potential inflation will result, as
in the case of the Vietnam War episode, which caused the Great Inflation of the
1970s.
The Weimar episode fits this story even though Germany was
clearly running below its pre-First World War potential level of output. The first stages of the inflationary process
was the result of the Weimar government printing money to make payments to
returning German soldiers, the idea being to avoid social unrest. Unfortunately, the increase in the medium of
exchange (on top of the money which had been printed to pay for the German war
effort) was not accompanied by an increase in real, physical output. The German authorities managed to disguise
this for a while, making it look as if Germany had come through the war in much
better shape than Britain or France had, which in turn encouraged capital
inflows from the US (it was in this period that Maynard Keynes lost a large
amount of money on currency speculation).
Thus German railway workers returning from military service were
notionally re-employed, and being paid, even though there were no trains for
them to run.
The Weimar hyperinflation was a result of a deliberate
expansion of the money supply with no intent of increasing output. The money was printed to make payments to
Germans engaging in passive resistance to the occupation of the Ruhr by French
and Belgian troops in 1923. Not
surprisingly, this produced an inflation – so much so that prices were rising
faster than the money supply was growing, as people spent in anticipation of
ongoing price increases. They spent the
money on commodities partly because incomes in Germany generally were by then
lagging well behind the rate of increase of the cost of living, but also
because there were no financial instruments which could be used to shield
incomes from inflation. Patriotic middle
class Germans who had put their savings into government bonds during the war
(heeding exhortations to exchange their holdings of gold coins for government
bonds) found themselves wiped out by the inflation. Only real goods had any chance of holding
their value since their prices rose (by definition) at the rate of inflation.
The hyperinflation only came to an end with the issue of
Rentenmarks, notionally to replace Reichsmarks.
Technically the Rentenmark was a land backed currency but the real
reason it brought the hyperinflation to an almost dead halt was because it
provided an opportunity for the increase in the money supply to be halted. So in its origin and in its end the Weimar
inflation was a classic monetarist episode.
The recent QE episode in the US is quite a different
creature. The expansion of the monetary
base, even though the Fed was using it to buy US government bonds, was not
aimed directly at increasing spending. The
initial idea was to ensure the liquidity of the US financial system. The Fed was buying bonds at auction, in the
manner in which it was accustomed to conduct open market operations, but on a
much larger scale than usual. It was
able to buy in massive quantity because it could print as much cash as was
needed to persuade holders of government debt to sell.
The reason someone holds government debt is to convert it to
cash at some point in the future. If you
hold it to maturity you know exactly how much cash you’ll get for it. Because the Fed can create the cash, it can
offer whatever amount it takes to convince holders of government debt that
they’d be better off selling now than holding to maturity (or selling at some
point before maturity).
Basically, then, what the fed was doing was convincing savers
to exchange a significant part of their holdings of government debt for more
cash than they’d expected to get for it.
But the people who had sold the debt to the fed hadn’t been planning to
spend it now – they were using it as a saving instrument. What the fed had done was given them the
capacity to buy considerably more financial instruments. After all, government debt was not the only
form of debt available at various maturities.
It’s not surprising if people who had no particular plans to spend their
wealth today reacted to having more cash than they had expected by replacing
the maturities they’d sold, in the process helping to push interest rates down.
In addition, the Fed started paying interest on excess
reserves of commercial banks. That
encouraged the banks (which also increased their holdings of highly liquid
government debt) to treat deposits at the Fed as a safe asset. If they expanded their loans to the private
sector, those reserves would cease to be excess reserves and would become
required reserves, so the banks would have exchanged a safe interest earning
asset for a risky (private sector) one. (Interest on excess reserves also ties in to the argument about whether a group in the US should be permitted to establish a Narrow Bank. John Cochrane discusses the arguments here.)
In the QE episode, then, people who sold their holdings of
government bonds to the Fed were not doing so with the intent of spending the
money on goods, while the banks, in whose accounts with the Fed toe proceeds of
those sales would up, were initially very risk averse about expanding their
loans – their own liquidity preference had increased – and were then encouraged
to keep those funds with the Fed to earn interest payments on excess
reserves. Any stimulus to spending was
supposed to come through low interest rates encouraging spending on physical
capital, but the inward shift of the Investment function more than outweighed
any effect associated with a movement along the in-shifted function. The MMTers argue, and its hard to dispute
them on this point, that monetary policy operating through the interest rate
channel to physical investment is not a very effective anti-recessionary
policy.
Overall, then, so long as we’re prepared to work in a
Keynesian AD/AS context, we can make sense of elements of the MMT argument but
also make a case that their use of the QE episode to dispute the monetarist
inflation argument does not hold up. The
circumstances are different, but Richard Cantillon’s argument that you have to
pay attention to the way new money enters the economy still holds up.
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