As we watch the ongoing sparring between the Trump White
House and the Federal Reserve, with the question of whether the President can fire the Chair of the Fed always looming in the background, it’s worth keeping in mind that we (Canada)
went through this once ourselves.
And by This, I mean the whole thing – populist head of
government, who was convinced that the head of the central bank was running a
tight money policy with the deliberate aim of sabotaging the government’s
expansionary economic policy, central bank head sticking to his guns, head of
government threatening to fire him, despite its not being clear whether a
policy disagreement constituted grounds for dismissal, the whole works. In our case, it ended with the head of the
central bank effectively being fired.
It happened in 1961, and it’s known in Canadian economic
history as the Coyne Affair.
The Prime Minister in question was John Diefenbaker and the Governor of the Bank of Canada was James Coyne who passed away a few years ago at the age of 102. Larry Schembri has material on the affair
here and here and there’s a chapter on the Coyne Affair in Jack Granatstein’s history of Canada between 1957 and 1967.
It’s notable not just because of the conflict between Coyne
and Diefenbaker, but also because it inspired Robert Mundell’s work on the
effectiveness of fiscal versus monetary policy under fixed versus flexible
exchange rates.
The usual story is that Diefenbaker’s government wanted to follow
an expansionary fiscal policy whereas Coyne, as Governor of the Bank, saw
inflation as a more serious problem than unemployment and was running a tight
money policy. Going into the 1957 election
(which nobody thought he could win) Diefenbaker’s Tories had attacked the
previous Liberal government for running a tight monetary policy, and the
Liberals had tried to fob the issue off by claiming that monetary policy was
the purview of the governor of the Bank and that the government couldn’t
intervene. The then-opposition Tories
had responded that the elected government was ultimately responsible for the
direction of economic policy, even if the details of monetary policy management
were left in the hands of the Bank. After
the Tories won the election the tables were turned, with the Liberals pointing
to high interest rates and demanding an easier monetary policy and the Tories split
over how to respond.
Coyne, in fact, denied that monetary policy was tight, or
had ever been particularly tight, and arguing that interest rates were being
driven up by the expansionary deficits being run by the federal and provincial
governments. In modelling terms, the
government were arguing that interest rates were high because the Bank was
keeping the LM curve shifted too far to the left, while Coyne was arguing that
they were high because expansionary fiscal policy was shifting the IS curve to
the right along an un-shifted LM curve.
There were other nuances involved – for example, Coyne
declared himself to be an anti-Keynesian, while the then Clerk of the Privy
Council was Bob Bryce who’d studied economics at Cambridge under John Maynard Keynes and who is
generally regarded as the one who converted Canada to Keynesian economic
policy. But more important than that was
the relation between Canada and the IMF.
Canada had been an active participant at the Bretton Woods
conference, out of which came the International Monetary Fund with its goal of
re-establishing international monetary stability on the basis of fixed exchange
rates, but Canada also discovered early on something which we now take for
granted, that committing to fixed
exchange rates requires monetary policy to be devoted to that goal, meaning
that it can’t be used for other domestic economic objectives. Basically, it denies a country the ability to
have an independent monetary policy. Once
Canada realized this, we moved quickly to let the exchange rate float. The IMF was decidedly unhappy: if an active
founding member like Canada abandoned fixed exchange rates, others might well
follow, and that might lead to a repeat of the monetary chaos of the brief
period of floating rates in the 1930s, which Bretton Woods had aimed to
prevent.
Canada, however, resisted the IMF’s pressure, so the Coyne
Affair played out in a floating exchange rate regime. The problem was that nobody really knew what
to expect – as Schembri points out, Robert Mundell’s work on policy
effectiveness under fixed and floating exchange rates didn’t come along until afterwards,
when it basically showed why things worked out as they did.
Assume for the moment that Coyne was in fact following a
tight money policy, shifting the LM curve to the left in response to spikes in
inflation. That would drive up Canadian
interest rates, which would reduce investment spending as the LM curve slid
along the IS curve and which would also attract financial capital from other
countries, in particular from the US. Just
to make things more dramatic, at that time the only place in the world where
financial capital could flow easily across national borders was between Canada and the
US, so the supply curve for capital flows was very close to perfectly
elastic. Under a flexible exchange rate,
the inflow of US financial capital, which would have to be converted to
Canadian dollars before it could be invested here, would drive the exchange
rate – the price of the Canadian dollar on the foreign exchange market – up,
and that in turn would encourage imports and discourage exports, shifting the
IS curve to the left and reducing income further. So a tight monetary policy would be highly
effective in reducing aggregate demand and easing domestic inflationary
pressure.
But Coyne argued that the Bank wasn’t running a tight money
policy – that the problem was the deficits being run by the federal and
provincial governments. Stimulative
government spending would shift the IS curve to the right, pushing interest
rates up. Under free flow of financial
capital across the Canada/US border, this would attract financial capital which
would drive the exchange rate up, discouraging exports and encouraging imports
and shifting the IS curve back to the left.
With perfect elasticity of financial capital across the border, the
process would continue so long as the Canadian rate of interest was above its
old equilibrium level, so the IS curve would continue to shift back to the left
until the economy had returned to its initial equilibrium point, making fiscal
policy completely ineffective.
That’s basically what happened during the Coyne Affair, and
whether Coyne or the government was right about whether monetary contraction or
fiscal expansion was at the root of rising interest rates, the experience of
the period prompted the development of the Mundell-Fleming model.
Whether it was right or not, the government put the blame on
the Bank for the onset of economic weakening.
Coyne saw this as an unjustified attack on the Bank’s policies and made
a series of public speeches attaching the Diefenbaker government’s fiscal
policy. (Remember all this the next time the press is trying, and failing, to get Stephen Poloz to comment on fiscal policy.) That was the last straw for the
government, but it turned out that they couldn’t simply fire Coyne, they had to
pass legislation declaring the office of the Governor of the Bank of Canada to
be vacant. And they didn’t want to do justify
this by a policy disagreement, because if they did the Bank’s credibility would
be shot. So they seized on the fact that the Bank’s
Board of Directors had recently approved giving Coyne (who was within months of
the end of his term and who clearly was not going to be reappointed – the government
couldn’t just fire him but it did have the final say over the appointment of
the next Governor, in that it had the power to approve or reject the Board’s
nomination) a pension double the size of his predecessor’s pension. The government claimed to be outraged, and
introduced a short bill declaring the office of Governor to be vacant. The bill passed the Tory-dominated House of
Commons, but was blocked in the Liberal-controlled Senate, which also held
committee hearings at which Coyne stated his case. Once the bill was defeated, Coyne resigned. (The Bank’s Board of Directors held off for a
month, then re-affirmed the pension which had been the pretext for Coyne’s
being removed.)
As for the Canadian economy, it entered a period of minor
chaos, complete with rapid drops in the exchange rate. The Diefenbaker government decided to return
to a fixed exchange rate, a process of which they made something of a hash, ultimately needing to take loans from the US, the UK and the IMF. But Canada eventually did go back on a fixed
exchange rate, just in time to import the inflation generated when the US essentially
financed the Vietnam War and the Great Society social programs by printing
money.
As to the relation between the Bank and the Government of
Canada, James Coyne’s successor, Louis Rasminsky refused to take the job unless the matter was clarified. As it stands now, while the Bank of Canada is
independent in the way it chooses conducts monetary policy, the elected Government
is ultimately responsible for economic policy.
If there’s ever a serious clash between the Bank and the Government, the
Minister of Finance will give the Governor an instruction in the House of Commons, the
Governor will implement the Minister’s directive and will then resign.
While one the one hand this rule places ultimate authority
with the Government, on the other hand the fact that the whole process must be
played out in public and would lead to the resignation of the Governor effectively means that the Government would only undertake it in dire
circumstances. And while there have been
Governors since Coyne who have probably pissed their Ministers of Finance off, none have ever done it to the point where the Minister was willing to invoke
their only – basically nuclear – option.
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