One of the key assumptions of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT)
has been referred to (by critics of MMT) as a notional merging of the
monetary and fiscal authorities – the central bank, the department of finance
and the spending departments – under a single heading: Government. This leads to an odd characterization of the effects
of government spending on the money supply.
Wednesday, May 29, 2019
Friday, May 24, 2019
Reconsidering Okun's Law
A recent paper by Lim, Dixon and van Ours (2018) (note - the link is to a pdf of their working paper) has an interesting discussion of issues pertaining to estimating Okun’s Law relationships. There are a couple of versions of Okun’s Law: broadly it deals with the relation between aggregate output and the unemployment rate but it is sometimes written as a relation between changes in output and changes in the unemployment rate and other times as a relation between two gaps – the gap between actual unemployment and the natural rate, as a function of the gap between actual and potential output. Lim et al. (2018) deal with the changes version – what must the rate of growth of real output be if unemployment is to be held constant, or to fall.
Okun’s Law dates from the 1960s, and fell into abeyance for quite a while, but there’s been something of a revival in interest in it in recent years, connected with the revival in interest in the concept of the output gap. The gaps version is a more natural fit for that literature, but implementing it requires that we be able to estimate both the potential level of output and the natural rate of unemployment. For practical purposes the changes version is easier to implement, but runs into the problem that the estimated relation, as judged by the coefficient on the rate of growth in real output in the unemployment equation, seems to change over time. One objective of Lim et al. (2018) is to investigate why that might be the case.
Okun’s Law dates from the 1960s, and fell into abeyance for quite a while, but there’s been something of a revival in interest in it in recent years, connected with the revival in interest in the concept of the output gap. The gaps version is a more natural fit for that literature, but implementing it requires that we be able to estimate both the potential level of output and the natural rate of unemployment. For practical purposes the changes version is easier to implement, but runs into the problem that the estimated relation, as judged by the coefficient on the rate of growth in real output in the unemployment equation, seems to change over time. One objective of Lim et al. (2018) is to investigate why that might be the case.
Thursday, May 23, 2019
Modern Monetary Theory 1
Returning, for a bit, to Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), its current popularity in certain sections does inspire a certain interest in trying to sort out what it’s all about. Most critical comment on it has focused on the interpretation that MMT theorists hold that governments can run money-financed deficits to whatever degree they choose and for as long as they choose without generating inflation. This seems to me to be more the politicians’ take on MMT than the theorists’, but the fact that MMT theorists reject the notion of formal mathematical modelling makes it hard to sort out which among them is thinking in terms of what model.
Wednesday, May 22, 2019
The New York Times on the Fed’s Puzzle
The New York Times ran a piece on May 21 dealing, ultimately, with the Fed’s problem figuring out where the neutral rate
of interest is these days, although that term isn’t used in the article itself. The primary focus of the article is on the
ongoing puzzle of the relation between inflation and indicators of labour
market tightness. The framing device is
the story of a restaurateur in North Carolina whose business is booming and who
is hiring but who doesn’t want to risk passing higher wage rates on her
customers in the form of higher prices, because no-one else in the industry is
raising their prices.
Monday, May 20, 2019
Quantitative Easing and the Yield Curve
We tend to think of Quantitative Easing in terms of the massive increase in the US monetary base which it produced. As a number of commentators have observed, in one sense this easing wasn’t unconventional monetary policy, it was conventional open market operations on a massive scale. One part of Fed policy since 2008 which can legitimately be termed unconventional relates to the nature of the debt the Fed was buying. Traditionally, central banks have restricted themselves to dealing in very short term government bonds and re-discounting short term bills of exchange. One argument for this focus has been that central bank trading in short maturity debt would affect short term interest rates, and that arbitrage by financial investors as they adjusted their portfolios to the changed relative pattern of interest rates would cause rates on instruments of longer maturities to move in the same direction as short term rates were moving.
John Cochrane on Modern Monetary Theory
John Cochrane, formerly of the University of Chicago and now
of the Hoover Institution, wrote a blog post, a little while ago, giving his take on Modern Monetary
Theory (MMT). It had the potential to be
very interesting, considering that MMT and Cochrane’s own Fiscal Theory of thePrice Level (FTPL) start from the proposition that state-issued money has value
only because the state will accept it in payment of taxes.
Wednesday, May 15, 2019
The Stock Market and the Economy
The main thrust of the May 7 FP piece by David Rosenberg which was referred to in a previous post was that “..... the stock market has no statistically significant relationship with the underlying economy…….”. It’s an argument which has been made many times over many years, but it carries particular freight in the era of Quantitative Easing by the Fed. One of the channels through which QE was supposed to have an effect is referred to as the Portfolio Balance Channel – while Rosenberg takes a slightly different tack than I’m going to here, his article reminds us that we need to think of a portfolio as containing stocks, bonds and cash, and raises the question of the extent to which central bankers’ policy decisions should incorporate responses to stock market behaviour.
This isn’t a new question. In the run-up to the 1929 crash the (still relatively new) Fed board debated whether monetary policy should respond to the on-going run-up in the market, and more recently the Fed is said to have responded to the stock market 1987 crash by running monetary policy which effectively set the stage for later bubbles. Austrian School economists (see the Coordination Problem blog, for example) argue that badly designed monetary policy lies behind most financial bubbles – the central bank runs too easy a monetary regimen for too long then, when it realizes its mistake, tightens up too sharply, causing the bubble to burst and triggering a recession. In the case of post-2008 Fed policy, QE, which resulted in a significant increase in the size of the monetary base, involved the fed making very large scale purchases of US government debt on the open market (the Fed has historically been banned from buying government bonds directly from the Treasury, so it has to conduct open market operations through the auction market). This was something it was quite capable of doing because it could basically bid up the price of the debt it was buying to whatever level was necessary to persuade its holders to sell. The result was that groups which had been holding the debt were now holding more cash than they had planned, and started looking for income-generating assets to put it in. With interest rates at historically low levels, they put a higher proportion than would otherwise have been the case in the stock market, which tended to drive stock prices up.
This isn’t a new question. In the run-up to the 1929 crash the (still relatively new) Fed board debated whether monetary policy should respond to the on-going run-up in the market, and more recently the Fed is said to have responded to the stock market 1987 crash by running monetary policy which effectively set the stage for later bubbles. Austrian School economists (see the Coordination Problem blog, for example) argue that badly designed monetary policy lies behind most financial bubbles – the central bank runs too easy a monetary regimen for too long then, when it realizes its mistake, tightens up too sharply, causing the bubble to burst and triggering a recession. In the case of post-2008 Fed policy, QE, which resulted in a significant increase in the size of the monetary base, involved the fed making very large scale purchases of US government debt on the open market (the Fed has historically been banned from buying government bonds directly from the Treasury, so it has to conduct open market operations through the auction market). This was something it was quite capable of doing because it could basically bid up the price of the debt it was buying to whatever level was necessary to persuade its holders to sell. The result was that groups which had been holding the debt were now holding more cash than they had planned, and started looking for income-generating assets to put it in. With interest rates at historically low levels, they put a higher proportion than would otherwise have been the case in the stock market, which tended to drive stock prices up.
Tuesday, May 14, 2019
Measuring Labour Market Tightness
Apropos of the release of the April Canadian Labour Force Survey, there was an interesting piece in the New York Times a little while ago on the question of why wages have been so sluggish in their response to falling unemployment. One argument that’s made in the piece is that the unemployment rate is the wrong indicator of labour market tightness – that we should be looking at the non-employment rate among prime age individuals. Non-employment includes both the registered unemployed and those people who have dropped out of the labour force – discouraged workers who would be willing to work but have stopped looking for work, in the sense required to have them counted as being in the labour force. In terms of the official measures, they show up in the form of a decline in the labour force participation rate. The argument’s been made that the reason wage growth has been sluggish is that improved employment opportunities have drawn discouraged workers back into the labour force, shifting the labour supply curve to the right and restraining the wage growth that might otherwise accompany an outward shift of the labour demand curve.
Sunday, May 12, 2019
A Note On The April 2019 Labour Force Survey
The April 2019 Labour Force Survey results made a lot of headlines because of the size of the increase in employment, but for purposes of judging where we are relative to potential output, and therefore what the Bank of Canada is likely to be doing, the details are what matter .
QE and Investment
There's an interesting piece by David Rosenberg in the May 7 Financial Post. His focus is on whether we should be taking the behavior of the stock market (specifically the US market) as an indicator of the health of the broader economy in the era of Quantitative Easing (in the US – it’s important to remember that the Bank of Canada didn’t engage in the same kind of QE), but in the process he also touches on the effect of QE on the real economy. His argument is that the rise in the broader stock market indices doesn’t actually reflect fundamentals, as we usually think of them, in the real economy. As he puts it: “……….today’s stock market has no statistically significant relationship with the underlying economy as it has in the past, nor is it a leading indicator by any stretch of the imagination.”
Let’s look at one of the points Rosenberg’ makes about investment.
Let’s look at one of the points Rosenberg’ makes about investment.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)