Another argument, which Paul Volcker points out in his recent memoir is that, so long as the central bank’s aim is to expand or contract the money supply by affecting the level of commercial bank reserves, buying and selling short term bonds was (in normal times) perfectly adequate for doing the job.
In QE, though, the Fed started trading in longer term government bonds. In particular, at one point, between what came to be known as QE2 and QE3, the Fed revived Operation Twist from the 1960s. This involved large scale buying of long term bonds to drive their prices up and long term interest rates down, and simultaneously selling short term instruments, driving their prices down and short term interest rates up. The objective was to flatten the yield curve, on the argument that physical investment spending is more sensitive to long term rates than to short term ones. That, presumably, is a testable hypothesis. As a corollary, the Fed’s increased propensity to aim directly at the long term end of the market is liable to affect the usefulness of the slope of the yield curve as an indicator of market expectations and a predictor of downturns.
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