The VoxEU Policy Portal is a site at which a wide range of economists post one- page summaries of
their recent research. The wide range of
material which gets posted there, on a wide range of topics, makes it a blog
worth keeping an eye on. Economic
historian Michael Bordo recently put up a piece entitled “The imbalances of the Bretton Woods System between 1965 and 1973: US inflation, the elephant in the room” dealing with the factors which led to the end of the Bretton Woods system.
The Bretton Woods system was an agreement negotiated in the
late stages of the Second World War to try and set the rules for the post-war
international monetary system. The World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund emerged from Bretton Woods.
The basic idea of Bretton Woods was to try and establish a
fixed exchange rate system similar to the older gold standard but not reliant
on gold. Broadly speaking there were two
competing plans being considered: the British one, drafted by John Maynard
Keynes, and the American one drafted by Harry Dexter White. There have been a couple of readable
histories of the negotiations published recently: one by Ben Steil and one by Ed Conway. In addition to discussing the
conference, they give varying opinions on the question of whether Harry Dexter
White was a Soviet spy or just a very friendly fellow traveller, and whether the
ultimate reason Keynes’ plan wasn’t accepted was because Keynes’ attitude
pissed the Americans off too much.
The key to Bretton Woods, as it finally emerged, was an
agreement among the signatories to maintain fixed exchange rates against the US
dollar and for the US to maintain a fixed rate between the dollar and
gold. It lasted, with varying degrees of
success until Richard Nixon ended gold convertibility of the greenback in 1971,
although it wasn’t taken off life support until 1973.
Bordo’s VoxEU piece, and the research paper he’s
summarizing, deals with the August 1971 meeting at Camp David at which Richard
Nixon made the decision to end convertibility.
By that time, the US had built up a pretty hefty current account
deficit, which Nixon chose to blame on the actions of America’s trading
partners. Other countries had been
building up large holdings of US dollars, far beyond anything the US could hope
to exchange for gold at the price agreed at Bretton Woods.
Bordo’s
argument (and I think you’d be hard pressed to find any mainstream economists
who disagreed with him) was that the strains were in fact the result of the
inflationary pressures which built up in the US through the late 1960s as result
of the Fed’s basically printing money to fund the Vietnam war.
As Bordo puts it (with a couple of citations removed from
the original):
“What was kept in the background on 15 August 1971 was that US inflation, driven by US macro policies, was the main problem facing the Bretton Woods System, and for political and doctrinal reasons it was not directly addressed. President Nixon blamed the rest of the world instead of correcting US monetary and fiscal policies. In addition, at the urging of former Federal Reserve chairman Arthur F Burns, Nixon adopted wage and price controls to mask the inflation, hence punting the problem into the future. This decision in turn reflected both Burns’ and the Nixon administration’s unwillingness to recognise the elephant in the room and use monetary policy to reduce inflation directly. This reflected Nixon’s fear of a recession weakening his re-election chances in the forthcoming 1972 presidential election and Burns’ surrendering the Federal Reserve’s independence to political pressure.”
A couple of side notes, not mentioned in Bordo’s VoxEU
piece. Among the participants at the
Camp David meeting was Paul Volcker who was at that time an official of the US
Treasury but who would, later on, be the Fed Chairman who used tight monetary
policy to bring an end to the inflation caused by his predecessor’s easy money
policy. And among the trade measures
that Richard Nixon was planning was an end to the Canada/US Auto Pact, the
forerunner of NAFTA, which Nixon regarded as having proved to be a really bad
deal for the US. Plus ça change………
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