Thursday, June 13, 2019

The Great Inflation and the End of Bretton Woods


The VoxEU Policy Portal is a site at which a wide range of economists post one- page summaries of their recent research.  The wide range of material which gets posted there, on a wide range of topics, makes it a blog worth keeping an eye on.  Economic historian Michael Bordo recently put up a piece entitled “The imbalances of the Bretton Woods System between 1965 and 1973: US inflation, the elephant in the room” dealing with the factors which led to the end of the Bretton Woods system.

The Bretton Woods system was an agreement negotiated in the late stages of the Second World War to try and set the rules for the post-war international monetary system.  The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund emerged from Bretton Woods.


The basic idea of Bretton Woods was to try and establish a fixed exchange rate system similar to the older gold standard but not reliant on gold.  Broadly speaking there were two competing plans being considered: the British one, drafted by John Maynard Keynes, and the American one drafted by Harry Dexter White.  There have been a couple of readable histories of the negotiations published recently: one by Ben Steil and one by Ed Conway.  In addition to discussing the conference, they give varying opinions on the question of whether Harry Dexter White was a Soviet spy or just a very friendly fellow traveller, and whether the ultimate reason Keynes’ plan wasn’t accepted was because Keynes’ attitude pissed the Americans off too much.

The key to Bretton Woods, as it finally emerged, was an agreement among the signatories to maintain fixed exchange rates against the US dollar and for the US to maintain a fixed rate between the dollar and gold.  It lasted, with varying degrees of success until Richard Nixon ended gold convertibility of the greenback in 1971, although it wasn’t taken off life support until 1973.

Bordo’s VoxEU piece, and the research paper he’s summarizing, deals with the August 1971 meeting at Camp David at which Richard Nixon made the decision to end convertibility.  By that time, the US had built up a pretty hefty current account deficit, which Nixon chose to blame on the actions of America’s trading partners.  Other countries had been building up large holdings of US dollars, far beyond anything the US could hope to exchange for gold at the price agreed at Bretton Woods.  

Bordo’s argument (and I think you’d be hard pressed to find any mainstream economists who disagreed with him) was that the strains were in fact the result of the inflationary pressures which built up in the US through the late 1960s as result of the Fed’s basically printing money to fund the Vietnam war.

As Bordo puts it (with a couple of citations removed from the original):
“What was kept in the background on 15 August 1971 was that US inflation, driven by US macro policies, was the main problem facing the Bretton Woods System, and for political and doctrinal reasons it was not directly addressed. President Nixon blamed the rest of the world instead of correcting US monetary and fiscal policies. In addition, at the urging of former Federal Reserve chairman Arthur F Burns, Nixon adopted wage and price controls to mask the inflation, hence punting the problem into the future. This decision in turn reflected both Burns’ and the Nixon administration’s unwillingness to recognise the elephant in the room and use monetary policy to reduce inflation directly. This reflected Nixon’s fear of a recession weakening his re-election chances in the forthcoming 1972 presidential election and Burns’ surrendering the Federal Reserve’s independence to political pressure.”

A couple of side notes, not mentioned in Bordo’s VoxEU piece.  Among the participants at the Camp David meeting was Paul Volcker who was at that time an official of the US Treasury but who would, later on, be the Fed Chairman who used tight monetary policy to bring an end to the inflation caused by his predecessor’s easy money policy.  And among the trade measures that Richard Nixon was planning was an end to the Canada/US Auto Pact, the forerunner of NAFTA, which Nixon regarded as having proved to be a really bad deal for the US.  Plus ça change………

No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.