The US/China trade and possibly currency wars are rolling
along in what seems to be a random walk with upward drift. Pretty much the only thing you can say about
them is that they’re a source of significant uncertainty. It’s hard to say how far the two
sides are prepared to push the matter in practical terms.
The latest move from the Trump administration has been to
label China a currency manipulator, meaning that China has broken international
rules about using the value of their currency as an instrument for stimulating
exports. This is not an easy claim to
evaluate – a while back Donald Trump was
also claiming that the European Central Bank was a currency manipulator. In some senses it’s a charge which
could be levied against pretty much every country, since most places give the
impression that they believe that their best hope for stimulating their economies
is for someone else to pull them out of recession buy buying more of that the
first country wants to export. And it’s
pretty hard to distinguish between policies aimed at currency depreciation and
easy money policies aimed at domestic stimulus.
In terms of the US accusations against China, Timothy Taylor
has a thorough, and pretty scathing, summary here. The US seems to be relying primarily
on the fact that China’s running a trade surplus with the US, while ignoring
the fact that overall China’s trade is pretty much in balance. Back in the 17th Century, Thomas Mun warned against focusing exclusively on bilateral trade balances, arguing that
if you were going to focus on the trade balance you should look at the overall
balance.
While China probably doesn’t really fit the definition of a
currency manipulator, you can make a pretty good case that it is following
mercantilist policies although rather than the more traditional tariff (and currency manipulation)
approach it probably better fits the Colbertist approach of using domestic policy, today primarily finance policy, to prop up
export-oriented industries. Casual
reading certainly suggests that it aims to play the trade game by its own rules. Since the US is inclined to do the same thing
(and let’s not forget that the Democratic party also has some pretty high-
profile mercantilist-leaning figures) it’s not easy to guess how far each of
them is prepared to go.
Meanwhile, Hoover Institution historian Niall Ferguson argues that Donald Trump’s real target isn’t China, it’s the Fed:
“New York and Washington are full of commentators who went to Harvard, Yale and Princeton and consider themselves much smarter than Mr. Trump. They snicker when he calls himself a “stable genius.” But this President is crazy like a fox. His behaviour may seem just plain dumb, but it is, in fact, calculated to outsmart the Ivy League types.
The Fed says it’s cutting rates because of trade uncertainty that Mr. Trump himself has almost single-handedly caused. But it’s only doing a lousy quarter per cent. The crazy-fox response is to threaten yet more tariffs on Chinese goods on Sept. 1, two weeks before the next meeting of the Federal open market committee, which sets the Fed’s interest rate.”
Ferguson also makes the point that the way a lot of people
think about the state of the macroeconomy has changed:
“Officially, the readiness of central bankers to cut rates pre-emptively to avert recession, or at least to scrap rate hikes and further “quantitative tightening,” reflects a fundamental shift in economic thinking. The post-2008-9 assumption was that the goal was to fight the crisis and then “normalize” – that is, get rates back up to pre-crisis levels. But the counter-argument – that we face a problem of secular stagnation, not just a cyclical hangover – appears to have won the day. No one now believes that interest rates can return to where they were before 2008.
At the same time, there has been a widespread abandonment of the old principles of fiscal policy. Now even Olivier Blanchard, former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, says that rising public debts are less of a problem than used to be thought.”
As far as central banks thinking goes, the Fed seems to be inwait-and-see mode (although we should remember that Fed governors don’t seem to speak with one
voice these days) and the Bank of Canada talked about the trade situation in
its July 2019 Monetary Policy Report. Other central banks are taking notice
– the Reserve Bank of New Zealand cut its policy rate today by rather more than anyone was expecting and this apparently caused not only the New Zealand dollar to drop but also the Australian dollar, even though the Kiwi cut brought the New Zealand policy rate down to
equality with the Aussie policy rate.
The central banks which have cut their rates talk vaguely
about stimulating their domestic economies, but the uncertainty created by the
possibility of an on-going trade war will probably have shifted exporting
countries’ Investment functions in by rather more than a moderate cut in the
policy rate will cause Investment spending to rise, if it rises at all. Other commentators take a different view –
according to the Australian news report:
“CommSec's chief economist Craig James said the lower dollar would come as a relief for the Reserve Bank of Australia and other economic policymakers, even if it may be a headache for Australians travelling overseas.
"The weaker Aussie will increase the attractiveness of Australian goods on the global stage and against imported products," he wrote in a note.
Rabobank's Michael Every saw the RBNZ move as part of the global trade and currency wars, saying "the gloves truly came off" with the bigger-than-expected rate cut.”
The Kiwis et al. might not be trying to push their currencies
down relative to the US dollar, but at the very least they don’t want the Fed’s
rate cut to cause the US dollar to fall relative to their own currencies. In other words they might well just be trying
to maintain their exchange rates with the US.
But they probably reckon that it’s best not to mention that as a motive. It sounds too much like currency manipulation.
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