Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s attempts to justify the decision
to cut the US policy rate do not seem to be garnering rave reviews. Most of the criticisms in the press seem to
come down to the idea that the Fed should have cut rates more if it really
wanted to stimulate the economy. The
press seems to have developed a pretty firm faith in the power of monetary
policy to drive the economy.
They might have developed that view as a result of hearing
economists talk about policy options over the past many years. Monetary policy has been the focus of the
bulk of theoretical writings for quite some time now. That probably comes out of two observations.
One is the realization that fiscal policy (assuming that you’re
talking to an economist who thinks that fiscal policy works) is subject to
pretty significant lags. Milton Friedman
and the monetarists used to push this argument.
Even if you accept that fiscal policy works in the sense that there is a
Keynesian multiplier and that the multiplier is of significant magnitude,
fiscal expansion generally requires legislative action. Suppose the economy goes into a slump. If the government wants to increase spending
beyond what it had planned in its most recent budget, it usually has to get legislation
passed approving the spending. Then having
done that, it has to start the spending process. If it’s planning a major piece of
infrastructure investment spending, it has to recognize that there’s going to
be a pretty significant lag between when it gets legislative approval for the
spending and when construction starts on the new highway. It’s quite possible that the economy will
have started to recover from the slump before the spending begins, in which
case the spending isn’t counter-cyclical, it’s pro-cyclical: it gives the
economy an extra, inflationary, upward push at a time when the economy’s doing
pretty well all by itself. Tax cuts
might move faster, especially if you’re looking at something like cutting the
GST, but any time you’re looking at using tax cuts to stimulate the economy you
have to reckon with the fact that the Keynesian tax cut multiplier is smaller
than the spending multiplier. Basically,
when you cut taxes, a certain portion of the population will save the first
round windfall rather than spend it. The
Marginal Propensity to Save comes into play in both the tax cut and the expenditure
increase multipliers, but it comes into play sooner in the case of a tax cut
than it does in the case of an increase in expenditure. So a cut to the GST might not have the timing
problem to the same degree that an increase in expenditure would, but its
effect is on average going to be smaller.
The other factor is probably that in the past few decades our
most notable experience of monetary policy has involved tight monetary policy –
the anti-inflationary policies of the 1980s.
That episode differed from theoretical predictions in that, while tight
money did cause a recession in the process of bringing inflation down, the recession
was shorter and the pain was less lasting than a lot of people had
expected. Arguably that episode
convinced people that William McChesney Martin’s “take the punch bowl away” metaphor was right, to the point that they forgot
Marriner Eccles’ observation that expansionary monetary policy was like pushing on a string. That’s probably why when Blanchard
and Summers wrote their VoxEU piece about the need for a rethink of macroeconomics they seemed to think that shifting the focus back to counter-cyclical fiscal
policy would be a revolutionary step. It
would certainly go against the way a lot of macroeconomists had been trained to
think about counter-cyclical policy.
Getting back to Powell, he’s come in for criticism from a
couple of different directions from a couple of slightly heretical economics
bloggers. Stephen Williamson, who’s at Western these days, has a long post blog asking why the Fed did what it did,
and going over the evidence for looming weakness in the world economy (evidence which he generally finds unconvincing). Part way through Williamson’s post we get this
paragraph:
“But, suppose we thought that the only problem here is a slightly-below-target inflation rate. What would the corrective action be? Well, we need to go back to the policy rule stage to answer that question. What's the relevant theory to bring to bear on the problem, and what does the theory tell us the Fed should do? A below-target inflation rate says the target fed funds rate moves in what direction? Standard central bank practice says the answer is down. Why? Inflation-targeting central bankers argue that they have built up credibility with the public, who believe that the inflation rate will be 2% indefinitely. That's what a central banker means by "anchored expectations." Then, if inflation expectations are anchored, and assuming there is a stable Phillips curve, everyone knows that lower nominal interest rates imply lower real interest rates in the short run. And lower real interest rates, as everyone knows, makes "aggregate demand" go up. Further, as everyone knows, output is demand-determined, so output therefore goes up. Then, by Phillips curve logic, inflation goes up.”
To get the sense of what Williamson is talking about here
you have to remember his neo-Fisherian leanings. The neo-Fisherians start
from Irving Fisher’s equation which says that the nominal interest rate is
equal to the real rate plus the (expected) inflation rate. Then on the assumption that the real rate is
technologically determined, they conclude that if you want to raise the
inflation rate you should raise, not lower, the nominal rate. Williamson’s not pushing that notion hard in his
latest blog post, but it does seem to be there in the background.
The other criticism of standard monetary economics (Powell’s
not actually mentioned by name here, the starting point is a Bloomberg opinioncolumn by Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution by a heretic is by Scott Sumner atEconLog. Sumner’s general theoretical starting point (which isn’t
much in play in this post) is that the central bank should focus not on
inflation and unemployment, but on stabilizing Nominal GDP.
In this post, he’s being very Wicksellian in
the sense that he’s thinking in loanable funds terms and defining the
equilibrium interest rate as the Wicksellian natural rate – the rate which
equates saving and investment. His theoretical
argument is that the European Central Bank had a long period of holding the
market rate above the natural rate. That
discouraged investment and damped economic activity to the point of shifting
the investment function down – so far down that the neutral rate actually
became negative. The ECB, according to Sumner,
realized that it was in the process of causing a major recession and reacted by
slashing the policy rate. That’s what
Sumner’s discussion of whether negative European policy interest rates are an
outcome of a set of bad policy decisions, not a policy tool, is all about. Sumner concludes by saying:
“I would also quibble with Tyler’s use of the term “insufficiently expansionary”. I understand why he uses this term; my claim that eurozone policy is contractionary goes against common sense, and would turn off readers that might otherwise be persuadable. But at some point the economics profession needs to take a hard look in the mirror and confront the fact that 99% of what’s been written over the past 12 years about the “stance” of monetary policy in Europe, Japan and America is utter nonsense, with no theoretical basis at all. I know that sounds harsh, but it is unfortunately true. The emperor has no clothes.”
One thing that’s bloomed in the current policy environment
is unorthodox critiques of monetary policy and theory (don’t forget to add the
MMT people to the list). Personally, I
lean to Willem Buiter’s view that “the typical graduate
macroeconomics and monetary economics training received at Anglo-American
universities during the past 30 years or so, may have set back by decades
serious investigations of aggregate economic behaviour and economic
policy-relevant understanding.”
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