Tuesday, August 6, 2019

Heretics Versus Jerome Powell


Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s attempts to justify the decision to cut the US policy rate do not seem to be garnering rave reviews.  Most of the criticisms in the press seem to come down to the idea that the Fed should have cut rates more if it really wanted to stimulate the economy.  The press seems to have developed a pretty firm faith in the power of monetary policy to drive the economy.

They might have developed that view as a result of hearing economists talk about policy options over the past many years.  Monetary policy has been the focus of the bulk of theoretical writings for quite some time now.  That probably comes out of two observations.


One is the realization that fiscal policy (assuming that you’re talking to an economist who thinks that fiscal policy works) is subject to pretty significant lags.  Milton Friedman and the monetarists used to push this argument.  Even if you accept that fiscal policy works in the sense that there is a Keynesian multiplier and that the multiplier is of significant magnitude, fiscal expansion generally requires legislative action.  Suppose the economy goes into a slump.  If the government wants to increase spending beyond what it had planned in its most recent budget, it usually has to get legislation passed approving the spending.  Then having done that, it has to start the spending process.  If it’s planning a major piece of infrastructure investment spending, it has to recognize that there’s going to be a pretty significant lag between when it gets legislative approval for the spending and when construction starts on the new highway.  It’s quite possible that the economy will have started to recover from the slump before the spending begins, in which case the spending isn’t counter-cyclical, it’s pro-cyclical: it gives the economy an extra, inflationary, upward push at a time when the economy’s doing pretty well all by itself.  Tax cuts might move faster, especially if you’re looking at something like cutting the GST, but any time you’re looking at using tax cuts to stimulate the economy you have to reckon with the fact that the Keynesian tax cut multiplier is smaller than the spending multiplier.  Basically, when you cut taxes, a certain portion of the population will save the first round windfall rather than spend it.  The Marginal Propensity to Save comes into play in both the tax cut and the expenditure increase multipliers, but it comes into play sooner in the case of a tax cut than it does in the case of an increase in expenditure.  So a cut to the GST might not have the timing problem to the same degree that an increase in expenditure would, but its effect is on average going to be smaller.

The other factor is probably that in the past few decades our most notable experience of monetary policy has involved tight monetary policy – the anti-inflationary policies of the 1980s.  That episode differed from theoretical predictions in that, while tight money did cause a recession in the process of bringing inflation down, the recession was shorter and the pain was less lasting than a lot of people had expected.  Arguably that episode convinced people that William McChesney Martin’s “take the punch bowl away” metaphor was right, to the point that they forgot Marriner Eccles’ observation that expansionary monetary policy was like pushing on a string.  That’s probably why when Blanchard and Summers wrote their VoxEU piece about the need for a rethink of macroeconomics they seemed to think that shifting the focus back to counter-cyclical fiscal policy would be a revolutionary step.  It would certainly go against the way a lot of macroeconomists had been trained to think about counter-cyclical policy.

Getting back to Powell, he’s come in for criticism from a couple of different directions from a couple of slightly heretical economics bloggers.  Stephen Williamson, who’s at Western these days,   has a long post blog  asking why the Fed did what it did, and going over the evidence for looming weakness in the world economy (evidence which he generally finds unconvincing).  Part way through Williamson’s post we get this paragraph:

“But, suppose we thought that the only problem here is a slightly-below-target inflation rate. What would the corrective action be? Well, we need to go back to the policy rule stage to answer that question. What's the relevant theory to bring to bear on the problem, and what does the theory tell us the Fed should do? A below-target inflation rate says the target fed funds rate moves in what direction? Standard central bank practice says the answer is down. Why? Inflation-targeting central bankers argue that they have built up credibility with the public, who believe that the inflation rate will be 2% indefinitely. That's what a central banker means by "anchored expectations." Then, if inflation expectations are anchored, and assuming there is a stable Phillips curve, everyone knows that lower nominal interest rates imply lower real interest rates in the short run. And lower real interest rates, as everyone knows, makes "aggregate demand" go up. Further, as everyone knows, output is demand-determined, so output therefore goes up. Then, by Phillips curve logic, inflation goes up.”
To get the sense of what Williamson is talking about here you have to remember his neo-Fisherian leanings.  The neo-Fisherians start from Irving Fisher’s equation which says that the nominal interest rate is equal to the real rate plus the (expected) inflation rate.  Then on the assumption that the real rate is technologically determined, they conclude that if you want to raise the inflation rate you should raise, not lower, the nominal rate.  Williamson’s not pushing that notion hard in his latest blog post, but it does seem to be there in the background.

The other criticism of standard monetary economics (Powell’s not actually mentioned by name here, the starting point is a Bloomberg opinioncolumn by Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution by a heretic is by Scott Sumner atEconLog.  Sumner’s general theoretical starting point (which isn’t much in play in this post) is that the central bank should focus not on inflation and unemployment, but on stabilizing Nominal GDP.  

In this post, he’s being very Wicksellian in the sense that he’s thinking in loanable funds terms and defining the equilibrium interest rate as the Wicksellian natural rate – the rate which equates saving and investment.  His theoretical argument is that the European Central Bank had a long period of holding the market rate above the natural rate.  That discouraged investment and damped economic activity to the point of shifting the investment function down – so far down that the neutral rate actually became negative.  The ECB, according to Sumner, realized that it was in the process of causing a major recession and reacted by slashing the policy rate.  That’s what Sumner’s discussion of whether negative European policy interest rates are an outcome of a set of bad policy decisions, not a policy tool, is all about.  Sumner concludes by saying:

“I would also quibble with Tyler’s use of the term “insufficiently expansionary”.  I understand why he uses this term; my claim that eurozone policy is contractionary goes against common sense, and would turn off readers that might otherwise be persuadable.  But at some point the economics profession needs to take a hard look in the mirror and confront the fact that 99% of what’s been written over the past 12 years about the “stance” of monetary policy in Europe, Japan and America is utter nonsense, with no theoretical basis at all.  I know that sounds harsh, but it is unfortunately true.  The emperor has no clothes.”
One thing that’s bloomed in the current policy environment is unorthodox critiques of monetary policy and theory (don’t forget to add the MMT people to the list).  Personally, I lean to Willem Buiter’s view that “the typical graduate macroeconomics and monetary economics training received at Anglo-American universities during the past 30 years or so, may have set back by decades serious investigations of aggregate economic behaviour and economic policy-relevant understanding.”

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