Ardent supporters of a return to gold are prone to arguing
that committing to holding the value of gold in terms of dollars (and therefore
the value of the dollar in terms of gold) constant would stabilize the prices
of commodities generally or, another way of saying the same thing, hold the
real purchasing power of the dollar constant over time. They’re prone to pointing to the pre-first
World War Gold Standard period as evidence that economic stability goes along
with backing the currency with gold, and arguing that persistent inflation only
became the norm when countries no longer made holding the value of their
currencies constant in terms of gold their primary economic objective.
In assessing their claims, it’s worth taking a few minutes
to consider how the Gold Standard (which in the pure form which the gold bugs
cite only existed for about 50 years) came into being.
It’s true that gold and silver were used as measures of
value and mediums of exchange long before the Lydians came up with the idea of coins, and
the Irish went on using Hacksilver long after other places had adopted coinage.
That seems to have been because pretty much everyone was willing to take
gold or silver in exchange for other commodities. Coins were basically just devices for signaling
the quantity of precious metal in disks of particular size. So long as you trusted the word of whichever
local authority had placed their seal on a particular disk of metal, there was
no need to go to the bother of testing each individual coin.
Not every issuer could be trusted, of course, but after a while a fair number of major powers came, independently, to the
conclusion that debasing the currency by surreptitiously reducing the gold
content was not a good idea. That resulted
in the gold (or silver) content of local coins being stable and reliable, which
in turn imparted a degree of local price stability. People had an idea of how much gold they were
prepared to give or take for a certain amount of a particular commodity, and so
long as the gold content of the local coinage was held constant, that
translated into prices being expressed in terms of number of units of the
currency rather than being expressed directly in terms of weights of gold. You’d still get relative coin-prices changing
in response to things like supply shocks, but there would be no intrinsic tendency
for the value of coins to drop against all commodities – i.e. no general
tendency to inflation.
A side effect of coins being made of precious metal was that
the rate of exchange between coins was determined by the relative quantities of
gold in each, meaning that so long as the gold content remained constant, so
too did the exchange rate.
Over time, of course, peoples started moving away from the
use of coin towards the use of paper banknotes.
This happened at different rates in different countries – England was
one of the earliest places where people proved willing to accept paper notes as
money whereas in Germany, gold coin was still the predominant medium of
exchange in daily life right up until the First World War. The key issue here was the same as that
involved in the adoption of coins – if you trusted that the notes represented –
were backed by – could easily be exchanged for – a predetermined amount of
gold, you’d be willing to take the (much more convenient) notes rather than
gold coin. In pre-Confederation Canada
there was no central mint and hence no legal tender local coins, meaning that a
range of foreign coins circulated. There
were banknotes which by law had to be convertible into fixed amounts of legal
tender specie.
So now you’ve got paper money, but so long as it is
guaranteed convertible into gold at an unchanging rate it amounts to a claim on
gold and it’s as good as gold. The same
applies, of course, to every country whose banknotes are trusted in terms of
convertibility, so the rate of exchange between paper monies will be equal to
the relative quantities of gold they can be converted into. And when people started using bank accounts
and bookkeeping transfers rather than paper currency for payments, the same
applied – it all went back to the amount of gold a note was ultimately
convertible into.
So you’ve got the international gold standard, under which the
exchange rate between currencies was basically an afterthought, so long as everybody
was confident that every country held enough gold to meet the likely demand for
convertibility.
But the gold standard had its own drawbacks – every country
would have to go to the expense of building a secure facility to store the gold it might possibly need to make good on international conversions
(as well as holding gold in its central bank for backing domestic currency
conversion). So a number of countries
shifted from holding gold to holding currencies readily convertible into
gold. The one currency which, before the
First World War, was absolutely guaranteed to be immediately convertible into
gold with no hassle or delay was the British Pound. And if you were going to back your currency
with gold via the pound, it made sense to hold those pounds in the UK – in
fact, to hold them in the form of an account at the Bank of England. So the world shifted from the Gold Standard
to what was known as the Gold Exchange Standard and the Bank of England became,
as Keynes put it, the conductor of the gold orchestra. Which, considering how little gold the Bank
actually held (relatively speaking) was quite a feat.
Ultimately, though, all of this arose as the endpoint of a
process which began with everything being valued, by pretty much everybody, in
terms of physical quantities of gold.
The modern Gold Bugs think that we can return to what they see as the
relative economic stability of the gold standard era simply by fixing the rate
of exchange between the dollar and gold.
That having broken the chain we can, in fact, jump back to its
endpoint. And whether that would work
would ultimately depend on whether people still thought of gold as the ultimate
measure of value.
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