The Fed cut its policy rate on July 31, as most commentators
had expected it would do. The stock
markets initially dropped, since the rate cut was smaller than traders had
hoped for and because Chairman Powell’s comments didn’t seem to commit the Fed
to further cuts. By August 1 U.S. stocks
were up again; according to the Wall Street Journal because traders expect that
the Fed will again cut rates again later in the year. The key question here, of course, is whether
the cut will actually do anything to stimulate the economy. There are pretty good grounds for thinking
that the stock market’s response simply reflects the probability of making
profit from adjusting portfolio composition rather than from a growing economy.
The New York Times (in an opinion piece by Austan Goolsbee) and the Wall Street Journal (in a piece by Nick Timiraos ) both raise the question of whether interest rate cuts actually have the power
to stimulate the economy at the moment.
The Fed eased rates in part in response to uncertainties about ongoing
trade wars, but firm’s aren’t going to expand their capital stock if they think
that there’s a good, ongoing likelihood that the trade wars will depress the
world economy. They can always wait
until things are looking better, rather than spend on capital and have it sit
idle. In formal terms, the inward shift
of the Aggregate Investment (or Marginal Efficiency of Investment) function is
likely to dominate the interest elasticity of Investment. That kind of uncertainty effect is one of the
reasons many economists see Investment function as being the most volatile
element of aggregate demand and hence the factor which most strongly drives
business cycles ups and downs. A firm
which is considering a major investment project generally has the option of delaying
it for a certain length of time. When
uncertainty about the state of real markets increases, the value of the option
to wait and see how events play out increases in value. There’s a formal area of investment theory
dealing with precisely that issue – it’s called Real Option Theory (Robert
Pindyck of MIT was one of the formalizers of that notion – there are pdfs of
some of his lecture slides here ).
So any stimulus from lower interest rates is likely to come
from consumer spending, and there’s a pretty good chance that any shifting that
consumers were going to do from spending in the future to spending in the
present has already been done. Plus the
low interest rates that a lot od savings are earning these days will have
prompted some people to increase, rather than decrease, their current saving in
order to restore some expected future consumption.
When the Fed’s rate cut announcement was made, the NY Times ran
an article by Jeanna Smialek entitled "Fed Cuts Interest Rates For First Time
Since 2008 Crisis" which included this bit:
“ A little inflation helps to grease the wheels of a healthy economy, allowing businesses to raise wages faster and lifting interest rates, giving the central bank more room to cut in the event of a downturn.
Prices picked up just 1.6 percent in the year through June, not counting volatile food and fuel costs.
Wages are growing only moderately. An index of employment costs climbed by 2.7 percent in the second quarter from a year earlier, less than expected and a slowdown from earlier in 2019, according to data released on Wednesday.”
You’ve got to wonder if the NYT is suffering from a bit of
money illusion here. Is the article
saying that the larger the increase in nominal wages, the better? If wages increased by 2.7% (the article actually
refers to employment costs, but doesn’t define them) and prices increased by
1.6%, is that somehow better for workers than if prices had remained unchanged
and wages had risen by 1.1%? The Times
might be thinking along Phillips Curve lines, assuming that a higher rate of
inflation brings unemployment down, but at least some Phillips Curve models
assume that that only happens (and only in the short run) if nominal wages lag
behind inflation so that real wages fall, prompting firms to hire more labour. Newspapers have an advantage over policy
makers – they don’t need to have well worked out policy models in mind.
Over in the Wall Street Journal, back on July 30, Greg Ip
had a piece entitled “The Undeclared Currency War: How the ECB Is Forcing the
Fed’s Hand” (behind a paywall) in which he argued that the Fed’s hands were tied by the suggestion that the
European Central Bank would cut its policy rate (which is currently negative:
-0.4%) even further. As Ip puts it:
“The outside world has always influenced the Fed, because a foreign recession or crisis can hit U.S. exports and financial markets. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell has cited weak global growth as a reason the Fed will probably reduce rates. The new wrinkle is that the central bank is factoring not just foreign economic developments but also foreign interest rates into where U.S. rates ought to be.
“U.S. rates can diverge to some extent from global rates but there’s a limit to how far that process can go, because of integrated capital markets,” Fed Vice Chairman Richard Clarida said recently on Fox Business Network.
If one central bank raises rates and another doesn’t, capital pours into the first country, pushing its currency up and putting downward pressure on inflation, exports and economic growth. In the other country, the opposite occurs. These dynamics are why other countries often follow the Fed. This year, though, the Fed is a follower, not just a leader.”
What Ip is saying here is that, in the past, the US had to
pay attention to the world economy to the extent that changes in world
conditions affected US exports and shifted the American IS curve right or
left. Now, though, the Fed (and other
makers of economic policy) are going to have to pay attention to the BP curve
as well as the IS, LM and Aggregate Supply curves. The implication of Greg Ip’s comment is that in
Mundell-Fleming terms, the US is facing a very flat BP curve.
There’s an argument floating around that the flattening of
the US BP curve is a consequence of easy money policies. There’s so much liquidity sloshing around in the
world, and returns are so low, that hot money moves very quickly, in very large
quantities, to wherever it can get a slightly higher return. That’s made a lot of lower income countries vulnerable
to large exchange rate movements when money suddenly pours out (that, along
with widespread doubt about Turkish economic policy in general, compounded by the
recent replacement of the Governor of the Turkish Central Bank, is seen as a factor in Turkey’s economic mess). The reason that affects the US BP
curve is simply that so much of that money flows into US financial markets and
in particular, some suspect, into US government bonds.
Which will be made easier by this:
“A two-year agreement to raise federal spending and at the same time lift the government’s borrowing limit will go to the president’s desk after it passed the Senate with more Democrats voting for it than Republicans.
The bill, which provides for more than $2.7 trillion in discretionary spending over the next two years, was the result of weeks of negotiations between Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D., Calif.). It suspends the debt ceiling until the end of July 2021 and sets spending levels roughly $320 billion above limits set in a 2011 law.”
And also, as the WSJ suggests, lets American politicians of all
stripes ignore the issue until after the 2020 presidential election.
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