The recent Globe and Mail commentary by Bill Robson and Jeremy Kronick of the C.D, Howe Institute was in response to
remarks made in the Canadian Senate by Sen Diane Bellemare in which she
recommended that full employment be added to the Bank of Canada’s policy
targets. Sen. Bellemare recentlyresponded in the Globe to Robson and Kronick’s argument. Much of her Globe piece consists of things
like observations that other countries central banks have dual mandates, but as
part of her argument, Sen. Bellemere refers
to:
“………the view expressed on Jan. 4 at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, by two former chairs of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke, and by the current chair, Jerome Powell. They said that the trade-off between inflation and employment is no longer seen as a problem. Therefore, there is no need to achieve price stability at the expense of employment.”
The idea that the inflation/unemployment trade-off is not a
problem comes out of the fact that unemployment, in both Canada and the US, has
been falling to long term lows without inflation being pushed up above the
central bank targets of 2%. Actually, the
business about the trade-off between inflation and employment longer being seen
as a problem is not quite what was said (you can watch the AEA session here.) What Janet Yellen actually said was
that the Phillips Curve was currently very flat, and Ben Bernanke emphasized
that inflation expectations are currently well anchored.
If we’re being honest about it, saying that the Phillips
Curve is currently very flat is nothing more than a formal way of saying that
unemployment has been falling without inflation rising significantly. Unless we have some idea why the curve has
flattened, we’re just hiding our ignorance behind technical terminology.
The reason for the flattening of the Phillips Curve may well
lie in Bernanke’s observation about inflation expectations being firmly
anchored, presumably at about 2%. The concept
of an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve is a well established one. It means that people (individuals, firms,
union representatives and policy makers) form an expectation about how much
prices are going to rise in the next year (say) and build that into their
plans. Multi-year wage contracts, for
example, will tend to include an allowance for the rate of general inflation –
the rate at which some kind of average price level is going to rise. Firms which expect to see the demand for
their product rising relative to the overall rate of increase in aggregate
demand will expect to be able to raise their prices by more than the expected rate
of increase in the overall cost of living.
The expected rate of inflation is, in a sense, the rate at which the
general price level is expected to rise even when there’s no growth in aggregate
demand, so employment and unemployment are unchanging. Prices of individual commodities and wages of
specific types of labour will then rise faster or more slowly than the expected
general rate of inflation depending on the stage of demand in those markets. You can settle into an equilibrium in which
the actual (average) rate of inflation is equal to the expected rate of
inflation.
The question, then, is where the expected rate of inflation
comes from. At one point we assumed that
people tended to expect that inflation next year would be the same as it had
been last year, which meant that if you could get inflation to drift down,
expected inflation would move with it.
That seemed too backward-looking, though, so some analysts replaced it
with rational expectations, which basically meant that the rate of inflation
which people expected would hold next year (and remember that they’re forming
their expectations this year) would be equal to next year’s true rate of
inflation plus a random error term, an error term which for different people
could be positive or negative but which averaged out to zero. Again, if that expected rate of inflation
declined, it would be built into pricing plans and actual inflation would
decline with it (obviously I’m oversimplifying – the math could get kind of
hairy looking).
But there’s still the question of where the rational
expectation comes from. It’s not enough
to say that people on average have perfect foresight about inflation.
One possibility, which seems quite plausible these days, is
that people (meaning, remember, the whole range of economic agents) believe
that the Central Bank is serious about hitting its target and that they believe
it has the tools to do it. So if the
Central Bank says that its target is 2% inflation, that’s what gets built in as
the expected rate of inflation. If
that’s so, price and wage setters are going to be wary about raising their own
prices too far above 2% for fear of getting out of line with the rest of the
economy and watching their customers (who are regarded as pretty price
sensitive these days) head off somewhere else.
That means that when Ben Bernanke says that inflation expectations are
well anchored, he may well be saying that people in general believe that the
Fed is not going to let prices rise by more than 2%.
If you’re not a fan of the Phillips Curve, we can build the
anchoring notion into an AD/AS model – specifically into the AS curve.
Think about a Keynesian AS curve. It has a long, virtually horizontal segment
associated with levels of output below potential output, then as it nears
potential output it starts to get steeper, eventually becoming vertical. Broadly speaking, two factors determine the
rate at which the slope of the curve gets steeper as GDP rises. One is the rate at which the value of the
marginal product of labour declines and the other is the rate at which wages
rise. Most discussions of the current
recovery have focused on how slow wages have been to rise. Instead of wage increases cutting off the quantity
of labour demanded, firms have proceeded to hire from the part of the
population which had been classed as out of the labour force. Part of this might have been a statistical
artifact, since we usually judge labour market tightness by the unemployment
rate, and there are a number of studies around suggesting that at the very
least the concept of “not in the labour force” might well have changed. But the result has been that firms have been
hiring and expanding output without the kind of wage increases which had been
expected, suggesting a more elastic than expected aggregate labour supply curve. That means that such price increases we have
seen have been due to diminishing productivity of labour without the add-on of rapid
wage increases, and that might be happening because firms and labour both
believe that the Bank is serious about the 2% inflation target.
None of this, of course, means that every small businessman
is sitting there thinking: “if I raise my process by more than 2%, Stephen
Poloz will tell my bank to jack up the interest rate on my loan”. It does mean, though, that when that small
businessman is doing his planning for the next year, and thinking about what
kind of input price increases he’s likely to be facing, he is likely to be
influenced by what he’s heard about the central bank’s inflation target, and
also by how serious the Bank seems to be about that target. If the Central Bank is clearly determined to
keep inflation below 2%, that is likely to be the rate he will anchor his own
plans on.
None of this is proof of anything, of course, but it does
offer the beginnings of a testable hypothesis, to the effect that the Bank’s
focus on the inflation target has, in effect, flattened the positively-sloped
segment of the AS curve and enabled employment to rise by more than it
otherwise would in response to rising AD.
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