Thursday, July 11, 2019

The July 2019 Monetary Policy Report 1


The Bank of Canada brought out its July 2019 Monetary Policy Report recently ( pdf here).  The MPR is written for the press and the general public, so it’s short on technical modelling detail.  That’s why we have to dig into it a bit to get a sense of what lies beneath the Bank’s decision to hold the policy rate unchanged.

There are a number of interesting points, one of which is the fact that interest rates really don’t get discussed all that much in the report – at least, not in the sense of a discussion of the magnitudes of the effects of changing interest rates.  But that’s something  we’ll look at in another post.

What I want to look at in this post is the way the Bank is thinking about the effects of a possible escalation of the U.S./China trade war, how that feeds into its policy decisions, and how the Bank’s thinking seems to differ from the Fed’s.


The expectation in the US seems to be that the Fed will cut rates in response to the negative effects of the pattern of tariff and counter-tariff that we’re seeing at present.  According to Bloomberg:

Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell said downside risks to the economy remain with trade wars softening business investment and weak inflation, signaling that policy makers may be poised to cut interest rates as soon as this month.

Note that this is Bloomberg’s interpretation of what Powell is planning, not a firm statement of policy intent from the Fed.  As an interpretation, it’s pretty consistent with what seems to be the consensus press view of the appropriate response to the negative economic effects of a trade war.  And it’s an interpretation which Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz wants to discourage.  As Poloz sees it:

Investors may think central banks can prevent a trade war-induced recession by cutting interest rates, but it’s never that simple, says Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz.
Responding to a reporter’s question about the limits of monetary policy when dealing with trade tensions, Poloz replied it’s not as easy as lowering borrowing costs.
“My sense is that the markets are not really on to the complexity of it,” Poloz said. “It seems a little too easy that interest rates could decline and that makes everything OK.” 

Here’s what the Bank says in the July Monetary Policy Report:

Trade policy  changes are like supply shocks, with increased protectionism  leading to weaker activity and higher inflation. Monetary  policy faces a trade-off because it cannot simultaneously support economic activity and act to curb inflationary pressures.
And a bit further down:

On the demand side, these channels include negative income effects, tighter financial conditions and weaker business confidence. On the supply side, they include higher import prices for firms and households and lower productivity due mainly to disruptions in value chains.

What the MPR is saying is that part of the effect of a trade war, even one in which Canada is not a direct participant, is to reduce the demand for our exports, which will shift the AD curve to the left, and part is to raise costs of production by disrupting supply chains, which will shift the AS curve up and to the left.  (The Bank’s analysis is set out in a Staff Analytical Note here as well as in a number of more technical pieces which are referenced in that Note.)

The upward shift of the AS curve will put upward pressure on price levels, and both the upward shift of the AS curve and the leftward shift of the AD curve will both tend to reduce the level of GDP.  When the MPR refers to a supply shock, it’s focusing on the AS shift, and arguing that if there has been a leftward shift of the AS curve, an increase in AD, assuming the Bank could create one, is likely to translate primarily into upward pressure on prices with little effect on the level of GDP or employment.  It might be different if we were deeper into a recession, but at present we’re probably close enough to potential output for the Bank’s scenario to be the right one.

In a sense the Bank is harking back to the OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970s and 80s, which both pushed up prices and reduced real incomes.  In that period failure to recognize the fact that the AS curve had shifted led to an excessive reliance on policies to stimulate AD, in an attempt to counter the drop in income.  The upshot was the period of Stagflation.  

So the Bank is looking at both the AD and AS shifting effects of a U.S./China trade war while, if the press is right in its interpretation of Powell’s remarks (and the press might well not be right) the Fed is looking at it as a purely AD effect.  That would be odd if it were true, since U.S. tariffs on foreign made goods are going to have much more of an AS shifting effect in the U.S. than they would anywhere else, by directly raising the prices of imported inputs to U.S. producers, meaning that the U.S. is going to experience more of a supply shock from its actions than are other countries.

Of course, the fact that the press say that’s what Powell means doesn’t necessarily mean that it is what he has in mind.  The press have a tremendous advantage over policy makers: they can rely on gut feelings and assume that correlation implies causality, whereas policy makers need to do the modelling and work out the linkages.

But if the Fed is treating the trade war as an AD effect and the Bank is treating it as a combined AD/AS effect, the Bank’s approach seems a lot more sensible.

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