The Bank of Canada brought out its July 2019 Monetary Policy
Report recently ( pdf here). The MPR is written for the press and
the general public, so it’s short on technical modelling detail. That’s why we have to dig into it a bit to
get a sense of what lies beneath the Bank’s decision to hold the policy rate
unchanged.
There are a number of interesting points, one of which is
the fact that interest rates really don’t get discussed all that much in the
report – at least, not in the sense of a discussion of the magnitudes of the
effects of changing interest rates. But
that’s something we’ll look at in
another post.
What I want to look at in this post is the way the Bank is
thinking about the effects of a possible escalation of the U.S./China trade war,
how that feeds into its policy decisions, and how the Bank’s thinking seems to
differ from the Fed’s.
The expectation in the US seems to be that the Fed will cut
rates in response to the negative effects of the pattern of tariff and
counter-tariff that we’re seeing at present. According to Bloomberg:
Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell said downside risks to the economy remain with trade wars softening business investment and weak inflation, signaling that policy makers may be poised to cut interest rates as soon as this month.
Note that this is Bloomberg’s interpretation of what Powell
is planning, not a firm statement of policy intent from the Fed. As an interpretation, it’s pretty consistent
with what seems to be the consensus press view of the appropriate response to
the negative economic effects of a trade war.
And it’s an interpretation which Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz wants to discourage. As Poloz sees it:
Investors may think central banks can prevent a trade war-induced recession by cutting interest rates, but it’s never that simple, says Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz.
Responding to a reporter’s question about the limits of monetary policy when dealing with trade tensions, Poloz replied it’s not as easy as lowering borrowing costs.
“My sense is that the markets are not really on to the complexity of it,” Poloz said. “It seems a little too easy that interest rates could decline and that makes everything OK.”
Here’s what the Bank says in the July Monetary Policy
Report:
Trade policy changes are like supply shocks, with increased protectionism leading to weaker activity and higher inflation. Monetary policy faces a trade-off because it cannot simultaneously support economic activity and act to curb inflationary pressures.
And a bit further down:
On the demand side, these channels include negative income effects, tighter financial conditions and weaker business confidence. On the supply side, they include higher import prices for firms and households and lower productivity due mainly to disruptions in value chains.
What the MPR is saying is that part of the effect of a trade
war, even one in which Canada is not a direct participant, is to reduce the
demand for our exports, which will shift the AD curve to the left, and part is
to raise costs of production by disrupting supply chains, which will shift the
AS curve up and to the left. (The Bank’s
analysis is set out in a Staff Analytical Note here as well as in a number of more technical pieces which are referenced in that
Note.)
The upward shift of the AS curve will put upward pressure on
price levels, and both the upward shift of the AS curve and the leftward shift
of the AD curve will both tend to reduce the level of GDP. When the MPR refers to a supply shock, it’s focusing
on the AS shift, and arguing that if there has been a leftward shift of the AS
curve, an increase in AD, assuming the Bank could create one, is likely to
translate primarily into upward pressure on prices with little effect on the
level of GDP or employment. It might be
different if we were deeper into a recession, but at present we’re probably
close enough to potential output for the Bank’s scenario to be the right one.
In a sense the Bank is harking back to the OPEC oil price
shocks of the 1970s and 80s, which both pushed up prices and reduced real
incomes. In that period failure to recognize
the fact that the AS curve had shifted led to an excessive reliance on policies
to stimulate AD, in an attempt to counter the drop in income. The upshot was the period of Stagflation.
So the Bank is looking at both the AD and AS shifting
effects of a U.S./China trade war while, if the press is right in its
interpretation of Powell’s remarks (and the press might well not be right) the
Fed is looking at it as a purely AD effect.
That would be odd if it were true, since U.S. tariffs on foreign made
goods are going to have much more of an AS shifting effect in the U.S. than they
would anywhere else, by directly raising the prices of imported inputs to U.S. producers, meaning that the U.S. is going to experience more of a
supply shock from its actions than are other countries.
Of course, the fact that the press say that’s what Powell
means doesn’t necessarily mean that it is what he has in mind. The press have a tremendous advantage over
policy makers: they can rely on gut feelings and assume that correlation
implies causality, whereas policy makers need to do the modelling and work out
the linkages.
But if the Fed is treating the trade war as an AD effect and
the Bank is treating it as a combined AD/AS effect, the Bank’s approach seems a
lot more sensible.
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