Friday, July 26, 2019

The State of Macroeconomics


Judy Shelton, one of the names Donald Trump has said he’s going to put forward for nomination to the Board of Governors of the federal reserve, is probably the best known of the current crop of gold bugs, but she’s by no means the only one.  For example, SteveForbes of Forbes magazine, who’s run for president a couple of times, recently wrote a column in which he called on Mark Zuckerberg to back Facebook’s Libra cryptocurrency with gold rather than with the portfolio of safe assets in a range of currencies which Facebook has been proposing. (He also urged Zuckerberg to change the name of the cryptocurrency from the Libra to the Mark.  Presumably somebody at Facebook nixed calling it the Zuck.) 


Forbes took a stance with which Judy  Shelton would probably agree, saying that “You realize the fundamental importance of a currency that’s stable in value.  Money measures value the way a scale measures weight or a clock measures time.” He goes on to argue that gold does a better job of holding its intrinsic value than does anything else, and that:

“Your consultants, like most economists today, will be vociferously opposed to the yellow metal, burdened as they are by ignorance and countless myths and superstitions.”

Forbes seems to evince a degree of skepticism about economists’ understanding of how the economy works.  Still, we can’t be too smug: as Tyler Cowen put it in a recent Bloomberg column: Every era’s monetary and financial institutions are unimaginable until they’re real (that’s also the title of his Marginal Revolution post on the Bloomberg column.

Cowen’s point is that economists are prone to believing that their current understanding of how the economy works is the correct one.  That’s why virtually every notable economist (except Keynes) took it for granted that Britain would have to go back on gold after the First World War.  (Keynes’ comment about academic scribblers and defunct economists is probably apt here.  Keynes himself was highly skeptical about freely floating exchange rates.)

On the other hand, every economic crisis leads to demands that we throw away all of our past theorizing and adopt a whole new economic model.  Greg Mankiw has a comment on thissort of argument here.

Still, it’s one thing to reject the arguments of a newspaper columnist, but Olivier Blanchard and Larry Summers had a VoxEU column not long ago in which they argued :

“The changes in macroeconomic thinking prompted by the Great Depression and the Great Inflation of the 1970s were much more dramatic than have yet occurred in response to the events of the last decade. This column argues that this gap is likely to close in the next few years as a combination of low neutral rates, the re-emergence of fiscal policy as a primary stabilisation tool, difficulties in hitting inflation targets, and the financial ramifications of a low-rate environment lead to important changes in our understanding of the macroeconomy and in policy judgements about how to achieve the best performance.”

It's not entirely clear what we should take as the gist of their argument.  Is it that every crisis is the result of a fundamental change in the nature of the macroeconomy, so we should throw replace our old models with models designed for current circumstances, then be ready to discard that model when a new major shock occurs?  When they talk about the re-emergence of fiscal policy as a primary stabilization tool, are they saying that there has been a structural change which has made monetary policy intrinsically ineffective or are they saying that the particular models they used overestimated the potency of monetary policy?  In one sense the two come to the same thing – we can argue that the nature of the economy hasn’t changed but that recent experience should lead us to reject the models which have been predominant in academic circles (would a re-emergence of fiscal policy as a primary stabilization tool mean a return to the Keynesian model?).

One economist who has already expressed himself quite clearly in that regard is Willem Buiter, in a 2009 VoxEU column which he titled “The unfortunate uselessness of most ‘state of the art’ academic monetary economics”.  Buiter argued, from the perspective of a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, that

“…. the typical graduate macroeconomics and monetary economics training received at Anglo-American universities during the past 30 years or so, may have set back by decades serious investigations of aggregate economic behaviour and economic policy-relevant understanding. It was a privately and socially costly waste of time and other resources.”

Heh.

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