One expression which you come across pretty frequently these
days refers to the Bank of Canada as having enlarged its balance sheet. Given what the Bank is, that basically refers
to its creating new money, but just saying that is being a bit too
bald. Fortunately, the Bank has an
explanation of its balance sheet here, and while the text at that site was written in 2019, the charts are up to
date.
The Bank’s balance sheet is a statement of the Bank’s assets
and liabilities, where its liabilities are what make up the monetary base. Since we refer to an increase in its
liabilities as “printing money”, it’s interesting to note that back at the end
of 2018 the largest single item among its liabilities was “Bank notes in
circulation” at about $90 billion, followed by Government of Canada deposits at
about $22 billion. (Strictly speaking that’s
liabilities and capital, but I’m going to be sloppy here.) Deposits held at the Bank by members of
Payments Canada came in at $251 Million, as is consistent with Canada’s having
eliminated reserve requirements as we traditionally talked about them quite
some time ago. The asset side was dominated
by Government of Canada bonds, at $79 billion, with Government of Canada
Treasury Bills coming in second at $24 billion and repos at just over $10
billion. Total assets and liabilities at year end, 2018, came (each) to about
$116 billion.
As of 20 May, 2020, the total on the balance sheet had
jumped to $442 billion. Government of
Canada bonds were at $125 billion, Treasury bills at about $92 billion and
repos at just over $200 billion. On the liabilities side, Government of Canada
deposits were up to $119 billion, and deposits of members of Payments Canada
were at $216 Billion.
So there’s been a pretty hefty jump in the monetary base
(which, incidentally, is a concept we don’t really use any more – not in the
sense we used to) and the Bank’s been buying a lot of assets. So why isn’t it more concerned about the
inflationary consequences?
Part of it, presumably , stems from a belief that we’re in a
demand deficient downturn so that a money-financed increase in (say) government
spending at present would shift the AD curve to the right, along a very flat
segment of the AS curve. Beyond that,
though, there’s the composition of the assets the Bank has been acquiring.
Repos are now the largest item on the asset side, making up
half of total assets. These are what we
used to think of as financial institutions borrowing from the Bank and using certain types of assets
as collateral. That kind of borrowing was usually done short
term, frequently overnight, to cover a reserve or liquidity shortfall on the
part of the borrowing institution, so the loan would be paid off very
quickly. The difference in terminology is
because the Bank actually takes ownership of the asset until it’s redeemed (repurchased) by
the other institution. In effect, the
original owner of the assets is pawning them at the Bank. The reason the Bank doesn’t regard that as a long
term inflationary issue is because they are all short term arrangements,
designed to ensure that financial institutions have plenty of cash on hand
should they need it, and in addition, since they're generally assets with fairly short time remaining to maturity, they'll be redeemed pretty soon. If the Bank is still running its COVID-19 programs at that point is can enter into new repo arrangements as older ones expire, and if things have improved there'll probably be fewer institutions looking to make use of the repo facility. So the idea would be that that new liquidity won't be around long enough to cause inflationary pressure.
A lot of the Bank’s acquisition of Government bonds from the secondary market is
serving the same purpose: the original holder of the bonds has sold them to the
Bank in exchange for a payment which the Bank makes into that institution’s
account. The idea is to ensure that commercial
banks feel comfortable making loans in bad times, although as the European
Central Bank discovered a while ago (WSJ paywalled article here ) that’s not always easy to do.
So part of the Bank’s view on the degree of inflationary
pressure probably arises from a view that an awful lot of the new liquidity
which it’s created, or enabled, will effectively stay in the commercial banks’ vaults, as
emergency back-up. Which leaves the bit
that has gone directly to government through the Bank’s purchases at primary
auctions. That’s worth a separate post.
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