Thursday, May 28, 2020

The Bank of Canada's Balance Sheet


One expression which you come across pretty frequently these days refers to the Bank of Canada as having enlarged its balance sheet.  Given what the Bank is, that basically refers to its creating new money, but just saying that is being a bit too bald.  Fortunately, the Bank has an explanation of its balance sheet here, and while the text at that site was written in 2019, the charts are up to date.

The Bank’s balance sheet is a statement of the Bank’s assets and liabilities, where its liabilities are what make up the monetary base.  Since we refer to an increase in its liabilities as “printing money”, it’s interesting to note that back at the end of 2018 the largest single item among its liabilities was “Bank notes in circulation” at about $90 billion, followed by Government of Canada deposits at about $22 billion.  (Strictly speaking that’s liabilities and capital, but I’m going to be sloppy here.)  Deposits held at the Bank by members of Payments Canada came in at $251 Million, as is consistent with Canada’s having eliminated reserve requirements as we traditionally talked about them quite some time ago.  The asset side was dominated by Government of Canada bonds, at $79 billion, with Government of Canada Treasury Bills coming in second at $24 billion and repos at just over $10 billion. Total assets and liabilities at year end, 2018, came (each) to about $116 billion.


As of 20 May, 2020, the total on the balance sheet had jumped to $442 billion.  Government of Canada bonds were at $125 billion, Treasury bills at about $92 billion and repos at just over $200 billion. On the liabilities side, Government of Canada deposits were up to $119 billion, and deposits of members of Payments Canada were at $216 Billion.

So there’s been a pretty hefty jump in the monetary base (which, incidentally, is a concept we don’t really use any more – not in the sense we used to) and the Bank’s been buying a lot of assets.  So why isn’t it more concerned about the inflationary consequences?

Part of it, presumably , stems from a belief that we’re in a demand deficient downturn so that a money-financed increase in (say) government spending at present would shift the AD curve to the right, along a very flat segment of the AS curve.  Beyond that, though, there’s the composition of the assets the Bank has been acquiring.

Repos are now the largest item on the asset side, making up half of total assets.  These are what we used to think of as financial institutions borrowing from the Bank and using certain types of  assets as collateral.  That kind of borrowing was usually done short term, frequently overnight, to cover a reserve or liquidity shortfall on the part of the borrowing institution, so the loan would be paid off very quickly.  The difference in terminology is because the Bank actually takes ownership of the asset until it’s redeemed (repurchased) by the other institution.  In effect, the original owner of the assets is pawning them at the Bank.  The reason the Bank doesn’t regard that as a long term inflationary issue is because they are all short term arrangements, designed to ensure that financial institutions have plenty of cash on hand should they need it, and in addition, since they're generally assets with fairly short time remaining to maturity, they'll be redeemed pretty soon.  If the Bank is still running its COVID-19 programs at that point is can enter into new repo arrangements as older ones expire, and if things have improved there'll probably be fewer institutions looking to make use of the repo facility.  So the idea would be that that new liquidity won't be around long enough to cause inflationary pressure.

A lot of the Bank’s acquisition of Government bonds from the secondary market is serving the same purpose: the original holder of the bonds has sold them to the Bank in exchange for a payment which the Bank makes into that institution’s account.  The idea is to ensure that commercial banks feel comfortable making loans in bad times, although as the European Central Bank discovered a while ago (WSJ paywalled article  here ) that’s not always easy to do.

So part of the Bank’s view on the degree of inflationary pressure probably arises from a view that an awful lot of the new liquidity which it’s created, or enabled, will effectively stay in the commercial banks’ vaults, as emergency back-up.  Which leaves the bit that has gone directly to government through the Bank’s purchases at primary auctions.  That’s worth a separate post.

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