Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz has been sounding remarkably
sanguine lately, and presumably not just because in a few days the current mess
will be Tiff Macklem’s problem. In
comments to the press the other day he was saying that he thought that the pessimism he’d been hearing was
overblown, and he was talking about how we’d shut off the economy and used
fiscal and monetary policy to put supports under it, going on to say:
“So afterwards, when we turn the economy back on – which we’re just beginning to do – you should see a very rapid return of production,” he said. “If we’ve done a good job, it will have been cushioned well – the shock absorbers have been put in place, and people can pick up where they left off.”
He said that it might take us a year to get back onto the
old growth trend line, but he is quite explicitly saying that we will return to
the pre-COVID growth trend.
Poloz has said that he tends to think of the current episode
as being akin to the effects of a natural disaster. I’m not entirely convinced of the analogy,
since a natural disaster generally involves some destruction of productive
capacity, but I’m probably misreading the analogy. In any event, Poloz is giving a video talk on
“Monetary Policy in Unknowable Times” to the University of Alberta on Monday
May 25, with the video to be posted on the Bank’s website.
The rapid bounceback argument does rest heavily on the view
that the current situation is best thought of as a major Aggregate Demand event. Thinking about how to model it, I’d be
inclined to set it up as a forced saving variant of the Paradox of Thrift
story.
In the Paradox of Thrift what happens is that everybody
decides to increase their saving rate – meaning their Average Propensity to
Save (APS) rather than their Marginal Propensity to Save (MPS). The increase in the saving rate is necessarily
accompanied by a reduction in the Average Propensity to Consume (APC), causing consumption
and Aggregate Demand to fall. The drop
in AD causes income to fall. To keep the
formal analysis of the paradox simple, let’s assume that we’re looking at a
closed, Keynesian economy so the S = I condition always has to hold. Then the
increase in the APS initially increases aggregate saving and pushed aggregate
consumption down, but because of the S = I condition and because nothing has
happened to cause I to increase, aggregate income falls, pulling aggregate S
down even though the saving rate, S/Y, has increased. So we wind up with a situation in which everybody
in the economy has succeeded in increasing the proportion of their income which
they save, but because this has caused income to fall the total level of saving
done in a year is exactly the same as it was before the increase in the APS
(because Investment hasn’t changed). The
result is that the economy winds up at a new, lower equilibrium level of income
with the same aggregate levels of I and S as before.
In the forced saving case it’s not a matter of people
wanting to increase their APS, it’s a matter of their being forced to hen they're told that they can’t spend on a whole mess of things they had been spending on
before. That causes layoffs in those
sectors and aggregate income falls. The
drop in income will be deeper than in the textbook paradox of thrift case
because the poor economic outlook will cause Investment to fall as well.
Then the restrictions are lifted, and here we have a key
difference between the paradox of thrift story and the forced saving case. In the PofT case we generally assume that
when aggregate income falls everybody’s income falls – there are no distributional
effects. That's a big part of why the economy stays at the new, lower income, equilibrium. In the forced saving case, certain
people (those who were able to shift completely to remote working) will have
the same income during the downturn as they did before it, so they’ll be saving
more in total, as well as as a proportion of income, than they would otherwise have chosen to.
When the lockdown is lifted the constraint on their spending will be
eased and they’ll be able to go back to spending on things like sit-down
restaurant meals. As their spending
picks up (and their APS comes back down to its old level) you’ll get an upward multiplier
effect operating. The dynamics might be
somewhat lagged – remember Poloz’s remark that it might take a year to get back
to the old equilibrium level - but that’ll be because there’ll be a lag before
some people decide that they’re comfortable eating out again or feel
comfortable in airplanes and hotels again (especially if there are signs of a
second wave of the coronavirus). But
there’ll be an upward multiplier process underway, and as for Stephen Poloz’s confidence
that we’ll get back to the pre-shock equilibrium income level, we know that that’ll be a supportable
equilibrium because that was the equilibrium which consumer spending had been
supporting before the shock.
So, as long as the lockdown’s lifted before there’s time for
there to be a significant leftward shift of the AS curve, Stephen Poloz’s optimistic argument can be
set up in an internally consistent AD-driven
model, and will be empirically testable.
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