The Bank of Canada released its April Monetary Policy Report
on the 15th and, as you would expect, it does not make for
cheerful reading. The focus is on how
deep the recession’s going to be and how long it’s going to last. Normally in the MPR the Bank reports what it
calls the base case forecast – what it sees as the most likely path for the
economy to follow over the next few months, then goes on to discuss upside and
downside risks – factors which could make the economy grow faster than the base
case projects (a risk because it could lead to unexpected inflationary
pressure) and factors which could cause growth to fall short of the base case
projection. In the April report they
don’t do that - there’s so much uncertainty about the next few months that the
Bank doesn’t even report a base case projection. Instead it pools all of the simulations it’s
run, each of which would have incorporated different assumptions about the
behaviour of key economic variables, into something which is almost, but not
quite, a fan chart for GDP (Chart 11) and another for inflation (Chart 12). Not quite, because a fan chart usually
indicates the probability of different paths by some kind of colour coding,
with the darkest range being the most likely path. The April MPR doesn’t draw any such
distinctions – instead its graphs include shaded areas which it labels as the
range of the scenarios, and there’s no variation in shading within the range,
suggesting that all of the possible trajectories are equally likely (or that
there’s no basis for thinking one is more likely than the others).
One interesting point: although it discusses both demand and
supply-side aspects of the downturn, its scenario graphs suggest that the Bank
is thinking of this as primarily a demand side effect. That’s consistent with its charts suggesting
that, regardless of scenario, the turn around will be sharp and will come
relatively soon. Its scenarios are
variants on a V-shaped episode. The most
optimistic one (i.e. the upper edge of the range of scenarios) having a
relatively small fall in GDP (relative to the other COVID-19 scenarios – it’s
still a lot bigger than the drop in the 2008 downturn) with a rapid recovery
taking real GDP back up to just a bit below where it was when the current
episode, then having it rise more slowly until it’s back on the (not very
steep) trajectory it had been following before the COVID-19 crisis began. The most pessimistic scenario, at the bottom
edge of the shaded area in Chart 11, has an initial drop in GDP which is twice
as large, over the same period, as the optimistic scenario incorporates, followed
by a sharp recovery which lasts for about the same length of time as that in
the more optimistic case but which doesn’t bring Real GDP back to anywhere near
where it was before the shock. Then it
follows a slow growth path according to which real GDP won’t have returned to
its pre-shock level even by late 2022.
In the most optimistic real GDP scenario inflation drops to
around 1% then rises gradually back to 2% by the end of 2020 and stays above 2%
for the rest of the projection horizon – i.e. into late 2022 – whereas in the
most pessimistic case inflation quickly becomes negative, remaining negative
until well into 2021, then, once it’s become positive, rising but still not
reaching 2% by the end of the projection period.
The Bank seems to see much of the difference between the
scenarios as being due to expectations, although as you’d expect the length of
the slump feeds on itself through a multiplier effect. The most pessimistic scenario is due to a
combination of persistent low oil prices combined with the pandemic requiring a
long-lasting shutdown. In that case, it
sees Aggregate Supply effects as playing a major role – what it terms long-lasting
damage to Canadian productive capacity with scarring caused by persistent
unemployment and firms going bankrupt.
Most of the main body of the analysis is sensible and hard
to disagree with. There’s a bit of
oddity in the MPR’s discussion of inflation, though, which I’ll touch on in
another post.
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